The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 10 · Chapter 15House of Lords, Feb. 13, 1740-1. (3)
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I may add, my lords, that your wisdom will easily find the difference between the degree of capacity requisite for recollecting the past, and foreknowing the future; and expect that those whose ambition incites them to endeavour after a share in the government of their country, should give better proofs of their qualifications for that high trust, than mere specimens of their memory, their rhetorick, or their malice.
Even the noble lord, who must be confessed to have shown a very extensive acquaintance with foreign affairs, and to have very accurately considered the interests and dispositions of the princes of Europe, has yet failed in the order of time, and by one errour very much invalidated his charge of misconduct in foreign affairs.
The treaty of Vienna, my lords, was not produced by the rejection of the infanta, unless a treaty that was made before it could be the consequence of it; so that there was no such opportunity thrown into our hands as the noble lord has been pleased to represent. Spain had discovered herself our enemy, and our enemy in the highest degree, before the French provoked her by that insult; and, therefore, how much soever she might be enraged against France, there was no prospect that she would favour us, nor could we have courted her alliance without the lowest degree of meanness and dishonour.
See then, my lords, this atrocious accusation founded upon false dates, upon a preposterous arrangement of occurrences; behold it vanish into smoke at the approach of truth, and let this instance convince us how easy it is to form chimerical blunders, and impute gross follies to the wisest administration; how easy it is to charge others with mistakes and how difficult to avoid them.
But we are told, my lords, that the dangers of the confederacy at Vienna were merely imaginary, that no contract was made to the disadvantage of our dominions, or of our commerce, and that if the weakness of the Spaniards and Germans had contrived such a scheme, it would soon have been discovered by them to be an airy dream, a plan impossible to be reduced to execution.
We have been amused, my lords, on this occasion with great profusion of mirth and ridicule, and have received the consolation of hearing that Britain is an island, and that an island is not to be invaded without ships. We have been informed of the nature of the king's territories, and of the natural strength of the fortress of Gibraltar; but the noble lord forgot that though Britain has no dominions on the continent, yet our sovereign has there a very extensive country, which, though we are not to make war for the sake of strengthening or enlarging it, we are, surely, to defend when we have drawn an invasion upon it.
The weakness of the Spaniards, my lords, has been also much enlarged upon, but the strength of the jacobites at home has been passed over in silence, though it is apparent how easily the pretender might have landed here, and with what warmth his cause would have been espoused, not only by those whose religion avowed and professed makes them the enemies of the present royal family, but by many whom prospects of interest, the love of novelty, and rage of disappointment, might have inclined to a change.
That no such stipulations were made by that treaty, that no injury was intended to our commerce, nor any invasion proposed in favour of the pretender, are very bold assertions, and though they could be supported by all the evidence that negatives admit of, yet will not easily be believed by your lordships, in opposition to the solemn assurances of his late majesty. It is evident, from this instance, how much prejudice prevails over argument; they are ready to condemn the right honourable gentleman to whom they give the title of sole minister, upon the suffrage of common fame, yet will not acquit him upon the testimony of the king himself.
But, my lords, the arguments alleged to prove the improbability of such a confederacy, are so weak in themselves, that they require no such illustrious evidence to overbalance them. For upon what are they founded, but upon the impossibility of executing such designs?
It is well known, my lords, how differently different parties consider the same cause, the same designs, and the same state of affairs. Every man is partial in favour of his own equity, strength, and sagacity. Who can show that the same false opinion of their own power, and of our intestine divisions, which now prompts the Spaniards to contend with us, might not then incite them to invade us, or at least to countenance the attempts of one, whom they are industriously taught to believe the greatest part of the nation is ready to receive?
That they might have injured our trade is too evident from our present experience, and that they would have supported the Ostend company, which they espoused in an open manner, is undeniable. Nor is it in the least unlikely, that, elated with the certain power of doing much mischief, and with the imaginary prospects of far greater effects, they might engage in a confederacy, and farther attempts against us.
I am far from imagining, my lords, that it was in the power of the Germans and Spaniards united to force the pretender upon us, though we had stood alone against them; but the impossibility of succeeding in their design was not then so apparent to them as it is at present to us; they had many reasons to wish, and therefore would not be long without some to believe it practicable; and it was not the danger but the insult that determined his late majesty to enter into an alliance with France.
War, my lords, is always to be avoided, if the possessions and reputation of a people can be preserved without it; it was, therefore, more eligible to oblige them to lay aside their scheme while it was yet only in idea, than to defeat it in its execution. And an alliance with France effectually restrained the emperour, as our fleets in America reduced the Spaniards to desire peace.
Why we did not seize the cargo of the galleons, has been often asked, and as often such answers have been returned as ought to satisfy any rational examiner. We did not seize them, my lords, because a larger part belonged to other nations than to the Spaniards, and because the interests of our trade made it convenient not to exasperate the Spaniards, so far as to render a reconciliation very difficult.
In the terms of this reconciliation, my lords, it is charged upon the ministry, that they were guilty of contributing to the power of the house of Bourbon, by stipulating that Spain, instead of neutral troops, should be introduced into Italy. That those troops were less agreeable to the emperour cannot be denied, but it has already been shown how little reason we had to consult his satisfaction; and with regard to the advantages gained by the French and Spaniards in the late war, a very small part of them can be ascribed to six thousand troops.
With as little reason, my lords, is the charge advanced of neglecting to preserve the balance of Europe, by declining to assist the emperour against the French; for the intention of the war seems to have been rather revenge than conquest, and the emperour rather exchanged than lost his dominions.
That we declined engaging too far in the affairs of the continent, proceeded, my lords, from a regard to the trade of the nation, which is not only suspended and interrupted during the time of war, but often thrown into another channel, out of which it is the business of many years to recover it.
Nor have the ministry, my lords, deviated from their regard to trade, in their transactions with Spain, which have been the subject of so much clamour, and such pathetick declamations; they always knew what the nation now feels, that the merchants would suffer much more from a war than from piracies and depredations, which, however, they were far from submitting to, and for which they constantly made demands of satisfaction. To these demands they received such answers, as, if they had been sincere, would have left the nation no room to complain; but when it was discovered that nothing but verbal satisfaction was to be expected, the security of our trade, and the honour of our country, demanded that war should be declared.
The conduct of the war, my lords, has been frequently the subject of censure; we are told of the inactivity of one fleet, and the imperfect equipment of another, the escape of our enemies, and the interception of our trading ships. War, my lords, is confessed to be uncertain, and ill success is not always the consequence of bad measures: naval wars are by the nature of the element on which they are to be conducted, more uncertain than any other; so that, though it cannot but be suspected that the common people will murmur at any disappointment, call every misfortune a crime, and think themselves betrayed by the ministry, if Spain is not reduced in a single summer, it might be reasonably hoped, that men enlightened by a long familiarity with the accounts of past, and instructed by personal experience in national transactions, will produce stronger arguments than want of success, when they charge the ministry with misconduct in war.
But, my lords, they have not any misfortunes to complain of; nor is the accusation, that we have been defeated ourselves, but that we have not enough molested our enemies. Of this, my lords, it is not easy to judge, at a distance from the scene of action, and without a more accurate knowledge of a thousand minute circumstances, which may promote or retard a naval expedition. It is undoubtedly true, my lords, that many of our merchant ships have been taken by the enemy; but it is not certain that they do not murmur equally that they have been obstructed in their commerce, and have been so little able to interrupt ours, since they have so many advantages from the situation of their coasts. When we reckon those that are lost, let us not forget to number those that have escaped. If admiral Vernon's fleet was ill provided with arms and ammunition, even then, let all censure be suspended till it can be proved that it was ill furnished by the fault of the ministry.
Nothing is more common, my lords, in all naval wars, than sudden changes of fortune; for on many occasions an accidental gust of wind, or unexpected darkness of the weather, may destroy or preserve a fleet from destruction, or may make the most formidable armaments absolutely useless; and in the present disposition of some people towards the ministry, I should not wonder to hear an alteration of wind charged upon them.
For what objections may they not expect, my lords, when all the disadvantages which the nation suffers from the enemies of his majesty, are imputed to them; when daily endeavours are used to make them suspected of favouring arbitrary power, for maintaining an army which nothing has made necessary but the struggles of those men whose principles have no other tendency than to enslave their country. Let not our domestick animosities be kept alive and fomented by a constant opposition to every design of the administration, nor our foreign enemies incited by the observation of our divisions, to treat us with insolence, interrupt our trade, prescribe bounds to our dominions, and threaten us with invasions—and the army may safely be disbanded.
For the ministry, my lords, are not conscious of having consulted any thing but the happiness of the nation, and have, therefore, no apprehensions of publick resentment, nor want the protection of an armed force. They desire only the support of the laws, and to them they willingly appeal from common fame and unequitable charges.
I mention the ministry, my lords, because I am unacquainted with any man who either claims or possesses the power or title of sole minister. I own, in my province, no superiour but his majesty, and am willing and ready to answer any charge which relates to that part of the publick business which I have had the honour to transact or direct.
A great part of what I have now offered was, therefore, no otherwise necessary on the present occasion, than because silence might have appeared like a consciousness of misconduct, and have afforded a new subject of airy triumph to the enemies of the administration; for very few of the transactions which have been so severely censured, fell under the particular inspection of the right honourable gentleman against whom the motion is levelled; he was not otherwise concerned in counselling or in ratifying, than as one of his majesty's privy council; and, therefore, though they should be defective, I do not see how it is reasonable or just, that he should be singled out from the rest for disgrace or punishment.
The motion, therefore, my lords, appears to me neither founded on facts, nor law, nor reason, nor any better grounds than popular caprice, and private malevolence.
If it is contrary to law to punish without proof; if it is not agreeable to reason that one should be censured for the offences of another; if it is necessary that some crime should be proved before any man can suffer as a criminal, then, my lords, I am convinced that your lordships will be unanimous in rejecting the motion.
The duke of ARGYLE spoke next, as follows:—My lords, if we will obstinately shut our eyes against the light of conviction; if we will resolutely admit every degree of evidence that contributes to support the cause which we are inclined to favour, and to reject the plainest proofs when they are produced against it, to reason and debate is to little purpose: as no innocence can be safe that has incurred the displeasure of partial judges, so no criminal that has the happiness of being favoured by them, can ever be in danger.
That any lord has already determined how to vote on the present occasion, far be it from me to assert: may it never, my lords, be suspected that private interest, blind adherence to a party, personal kindness or malevolence, or any other motive than a sincere and unmingled regard for the prosperity of our country, influences the decisions of this assembly; for it is well known, my lords, that authority is founded on opinion; when once we lose the esteem of the publick, our votes, while we shall be allowed to give them, will be only empty sounds, to which no other regard will be paid than a standing army shall enforce.
The veneration of the people, my lords, will not easily be lost: this house has a kind of hereditary claim to their confidence and respect; the great actions of our ancestors are remembered, and contribute to the reputation of their successours; nor do our countrymen willingly suspect that they can be betrayed by the descendants of those, by whose bravery and counsels they have been rescued from destruction.
But esteem must languish, and confidence decline, unless they are renewed and reanimated by new acts of beneficence; and the higher expectations the nation may have formed of our penetration to discover its real advantages, and of our steadiness to pursue them, the more violent will be its resentment, if it shall appear, on this important question, that we are either ignorant or timorous, that we are unconcerned at the miseries of the people, or content ourselves with pitying what our ancestors never failed to redress.
Let us, therefore, my lords, for our own interest, attend impartially to the voice of the people; let us hear their complaints with tenderness, and if, at last, we reject them, let it be evident that they were impartially heard, and that we only differed from them because we were not convinced.
Even then, my lords, we shall suffer, for some time, under the suspicion of crimes, from which I hope we shall always be free; the people will imagine that we were influenced by those whose interest it appears to continue their miseries, and, my lords, all the consolation that will be left us, must arise from the consciousness of having done our duty.
But, my lords, this is to suppose what I believe no history can furnish an example of; it is to conceive that we may inquire diligently after the true state of national affairs, and yet not discover it, or not be able to prove it by such evidence as may satisfy the people.
The people, my lords, however they are misrepresented by those who, from a long practice of treating them with disregard, have learned to think and speak of them with contempt, are far from being easily deceived, and yet farther from being easily deceived into an opinion of their own unhappiness: we have some instances of general satisfaction, and an unshaken affection to the government, in times when the publick good has not been very diligently consulted, but scarcely any of perpetual murmurs and universal discontent, where there have been plain evidences of oppression, negligence, or treachery.
Let us not, therefore, my lords, think of the people as of a herd to be led or driven at pleasure, as wretches whose opinions are founded upon the authority of seditious scribblers, or upon any other than that of reason and experience; let us not suffer them to be at once oppressed and ridiculed, nor encourage, by our example, the wretched advocates for those whom they consider as their enemies, nor represent them as imputing to the misconduct of the ministry the late contrariety of the winds, and severity of the winter.
The people, my lords, if they are mistaken in their charge, are mistaken with such evidence on their side, as never misled any nation before; not only their reason but their senses must have betrayed them; and those marks of certainty that have hitherto established truth, must have combined in the support of falsehood.
They are persuaded, my lords, too firmly persuaded, to yield up their opinions to rhetorick, or to votes, or any proof but demonstration, that there is a first, or, to speak in the language of the nation, a sole minister, one that has the possession of his sovereign's confidence, and the power of excluding others from his presence, one that exalts and degrades at his pleasure, and distributes, for his own purposes, the revenues of his master, and the treasure of the nation.
Of this, my lords, can it be maintained that they have no proof? Can this be termed a chimerical suspicion, which nothing can be produced to support? How can power appear but by the exercise of it? What can prove any degree of influence or authority, but universal submission and acknowledgment? And surely, my lords, a very transient survey of the court and its dependents, must afford sufficient conviction, that this man is considered by all that are engaged in the administration, as the only disposer of honours, favours, and employments.
Attend to any man, my lords, who has lately been preferred, rewarded, or caressed, you will hear no expressions of gratitude but to that man; no other benefactor is ever heard of, the royal bounty itself is forgotten and unmentioned, nor is any return of loyalty, fidelity, or adherence professed, but to the minister; the minister! a term which, however lately introduced, is now in use in every place in the kingdom, except this house.
Preferments, my lords, whether civil, ecclesiastical, or military, are either wholly in his hands, or those who make it the business of their lives to discover the high road to promotion, are universally deceived, and are daily offering their adorations to an empty phantom that has nothing to bestow; for, no sooner is any man infected with avarice or ambition, no sooner is extravagance reduced to beg new supplies from the publick, or wickedness obliged to seek for shelter, than this man is applied to, and honour, conscience, and fortune offered at his feet.
Did either those whose studies and station give them a claim to advancement in the church, or those whose bravery and long service entitle them to more honourable posts in the army; did either those who profess to understand the laws of their own country, or they who declare themselves versed in the interests and transactions of foreign powers, apply to any other man for promotion or employment, he might then, indeed, be called the chief, but not properly the sole minister.
But it is well known, my lords; many of us know it too well, that whatever be the profession or the abilities of any person, there is no hope of encouragement or reward by any other method than that of application to this man, that he shall certainly be disappointed who shall attempt to rise by any other interest, and whoever shall dare to depend on his honesty, bravery, diligence, or capacity, or to boast any other merit than that of implicit adherence to his measures, shall inevitably lie neglected and obscure.
For this reason, my lords, every one whose calmness of temper can enable him to support the sight, without starts of indignation and sallies of contempt, may daily see at the levee of this great man, what I am ashamed to mention, a mixture of men of all ranks and all professions, of men whose birth and titles ought to exalt them above the meanness of cringing to a mere child of fortune, men whose studies ought to have taught them, that true honour is only to be gained by steady virtue, and that all other arts, all the low applications of flattery and servility will terminate in contempt, disappointment, and remorse.
This scene, my lords, is daily to be viewed, it is ostentatiously displayed to the sight of mankind, the minister amuses himself in publick with the splendour, and number, and dignity of his slaves; and his slaves with no more shame pay their prostrations to their master in the face of day, and boast of their resolutions to gratify and support him. And yet, my lords, it is inquired why the people assert that there is a sole minister?
Those who deny, my lords, that there is a sole minister to whom the miscarriages of the government may justly be imputed, may easily persuade themselves to believe that there have been no miscarriages, that all the measures were necessary, and well formed, that there is neither poverty nor oppression felt in the nation, that our compliance with France was no weakness, and that our dread of the treaty of Vienna was not chimerical.
The treaty of Vienna, my lords, which has been the parent of so many terrours, consultations, embassies, and alliances is, I find, not yet to be acknowledged, what it certainly was, a mere phantom, an empty illusion, sent by the arts of the French to terrify our ministry. His late majesty's testimony is cited to prove that stipulations were really entered into by the two powers allied by that treaty, to destroy our trade, subvert our constitution, and set a new king upon the throne, without consent of the nation.
Such improbabilities, my lords, ought, indeed, to be proved by a high testimony, by a testimony which no man shall dare to question or contradict; for as any man is at liberty to consult his reason, it will always remonstrate to him, that it is no less absurd to impute the folly of designing impossibilities to any powers not remarkable for weak counsels, than unjust to suspect princes of intending injuries, to which they have not been incited by any provocation.
But, my lords, nowithstanding the solemnity with which his late majesty has been introduced, his testimony can prove nothing more than that he believed the treaty to be such as he represents, that he had been deceived into false apprehensions and unnecessary cautions by his own ministers, as they had been imposed upon by the agents of France.
This is all, my lords, that can be collected from the royal speech, and to infer more from it is to suppose that the king was himself a party in the designs formed against him; for if he was not himself engaged in this treaty, he could only be informed, by another, of the stipulations, and could only report what he had been told upon the credit of the informer, a man, necessarily of very little credit. Thus, my lords, all the evidence of his late majesty vanishes into nothing more than the whisper of a spy.
But as great stress ought, doubtless, to be laid upon intelligence which the nation is believed to purchase at a very high price, let it be inquired, what proofs those have who dare to suspect the sagacity of our ministers, to put in the balance against their intelligence, and it will be discovered, my lords, that they have a testimony no less than that of the German emperour himself, who could not be mistaken with regard to the meaning of the treaty concluded at his own court, and to whom it will not be very decent to deny such a degree of veracity as may set him at least on the level with a traitor and a hireling.
If the treaty of Vienna was an imposture, most of our misfortunes are evidently produced by the weakness of the minister; but even supposing it real, as it was only a formidable mockery, an idle threat, that could never be executed, it was not necessary, that in order to obviate it, we should give ourselves implicitly into the hands of France.
It was not necessary, my lords, that we should suffer them first to elude the treaty of Utrecht, by making a port at Mardyke, and then directly and openly to violate it by repairing Dunkirk. That this latter is a port contrary to treaty, the bills of entry at the custom-house daily show; and as the customs are particularly under the inspection of the commissioners of the treasury, this man cannot plead ignorance of this infraction, were no information given him by other means. If it should now be asked, my lords, what, in my opinion, ought to be done, I cannot advise that we should attempt to demolish it by force, or draw upon ourselves the whole power of France by a declaration of war, but what it may be difficult now to remedy, it was once easy to obviate.
Had we shown the same contempt of the French power with our ancestors, and the same steadiness in our councils, the same firmness in our alliances, and the same spirit in our treaties, that court would never have ventured to break a known solemn stipulation, to have exasperated a brave and determined adversary by flagrant injustice, and to have exposed themselves to the hazard of a war, in which it would have been the interest of every prince of Europe who regarded justice or posterity to wish their defeat.
Now they see us engaged in a war, my lords, they may be animated to a more daring contempt of the faith of treaties, and insult us with yet greater confidence of success, as they cannot but remark the cowardice or the ignorance with which we have hitherto carried on this war. They cannot but observe that either our minister means in reality to make war rather upon the Britons than the Spaniards, or that he is totally unacquainted with military affairs, and too vain to ask the opinion of others who have greater knowledge than himself.
Nothing, my lords, is more apparent than that the minister was forced, by the continual clamours of the nation, to declare war, contrary to his own inclination, and that he always affected to charge it upon others, and to exempt himself from the imputation of it. It is, therefore, probable that he has not acted on this occasion so wisely as even his own experience and penetration might, if they were honestly employed, enable him to act, and that he has suffered our counsels to be embarrassed; that he sees with great tranquillity those suffering by the war, at whose request it was begun, and imagines it a proof of the excellence of his own scheme, that those who forced him to break it, may in time repent of their importunities.
For that in the management of the war, my lords, no regard has been had either to the advantages which the course of our trade inevitably gives to our enemies, or to the weakness to which the extent of their dominions necessarily subjects them, that neither the interest of the merchant has been consulted, nor the ease of the nation in general regarded, that the treasure of the publick has been squandered, and that our military preparations have intimidated no nation but our own, is evident beyond contradiction.
It is well known, my lords, to every man but the minister, that we have nothing to fear from either the fleets or armies of the Spaniards, that they cannot invade us except in America, and that they can only molest us by intercepting our traders. This they can only effect by means of their privateers, whose vessels, being light and active, may be easily fitted out, nimbly seize their prey, and speedily retire.
The experience of the last French war, my lords, might have taught us how much we have to fear from the activity of men incited by prospects of private gain, and equipped with that care and vigilance, which, however omitted in national affairs, the interest of particular men never fails to dictate. It is well known, my lords, how much we lost amidst our victories and triumphs, and how small security the merchants received from our magnificent navies, and celebrated commanders. It was, therefore, surely the part of wise men, not to miscarry twice by the same omission, when they had an opportunity to supply it.