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The Grammar of English Grammars · Chapter 690Footnotes: (2)

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[48] The author of this specimen, through a solemn and sublime poem in ten books, generally simplified the preterit verb of the second person singular, by omitting the termination st or est, whenever his measure did not require the additional syllable. But his tuneless editors have, in many instances, taken the rude liberty both to spoil his versification, and to publish under his name what he did not write. They have given him bad prosody, or unutterable harshness of phraseology, for the sake of what they conceived to be grammar. So Kirkham, in copying the foregoing passage, alters it as he will; and alters it differently, when he happens to write some part of it twice: as,

"That morning, thou, that slumberedst not before, Nor slept, great Ocean! laidst thy waves at rest, And hushed thy mighty minstrelsy."—Kirkham's Elocution, p. 203.

Again:

"That morning, thou, that slumberedst not before, Nor sleptst, great Ocean, laidst thy waves at rest, And hush'dst thy mighty minstrelsy."—Kirkham's Elocution, p. 44.

[49] Camenes, the Muses, whom Horace called Camænæ. The former is an English plural from the latter, or from the Latin word camena, a muse or song. These lines are copied from Dr. Johnson's History of the English Language; their orthography is, in some respects, too modern for the age to which they are assigned.

[50] The Saxon characters being known nowadays to but very few readers, I have thought proper to substitute for them, in the latter specimens of this chapter, the Roman; and, as the old use of colons and periods for the smallest pauses, is liable to mislead a common observer, the punctuation too has here been modernized.

[51] Essay on Language, by William S. Cardell, New York, 1825, p. 2. This writer was a great admirer of Horne Tooke, from whom he borrowed many of his notions of grammar, but not this extravagance. Speaking of the words right and just, the latter says, "They are applicable only to man; to whom alone language belongs, and of whose sensations only words are the representatives."—Diversions of Purley, Vol. ii, p. 9.

[52] CARDELL: Both Grammars, p. 4.

[53] "Quoties dicimus, toties de nobis judicatur."—Cicero. "As often as we speak, so often are we judged."

[54] "Nor had he far to seek for the source of our impropriety in the use of words, when he should reflect that the study of our own language, has never been made a part of the education of our youth. Consequently, the use of words is got wholly by chance, according to the company that we keep, or the books that we read." SHERIDAN'S ELOCUTION, Introd., p. viii, dated "July 10, 1762," 2d Amer. Ed.

[55] "To Write and Speak correctly, gives a Grace, and gains a favourable Attention to what one has to say: And since 'tis English, that an English Gentleman will have constant use of, that is the Language he should chiefly Cultivate, and wherein most care should be taken to polish and perfect his Stile. To speak or write better Latin than English, may make a Man be talk'd of, but he would find it more to his purpose to Express himself well in his own Tongue, that he uses every moment, than to have the vain Commendation of others for a very insignificant quality. This I find universally neglected, and no care taken any where to improve Young Men in their own Language, that they may thoroughly understand and be Masters of it. If any one among us have a facility or purity more than ordinary in his Mother Tongue, it is owing to Chance, or his Genius, or any thing, rather than to his Education or any care of his Teacher. To Mind what English his Pupil speaks or writes is below the Dignity of one bred up amongst Greek and Latin, though he have but little of them himself. These are the learned Languages fit only for learned Men to meddle with and teach: English is the Language of the illiterate Vulgar."—Locke, on Education, p. 339; Fourth Ed., London, 1699.

[56] A late author, in apologizing for his choice in publishing a grammar without forms of praxis, (that is, without any provision for a stated application of its principles by the learner,) describes the whole business of Parsing as a "dry and uninteresting recapitulation of the disposal of a few parts of speech, and their often times told positions and influence;" urges "the unimportance of parsing, generally;" and represents it to be only "a finical and ostentatious parade of practical pedantry."—Wright's Philosophical Gram., pp. 224 and 226. It would be no great mistake to imagine, that this gentleman's system of grammar, applied in any way to practice, could not fail to come under this unflattering description; but, to entertain this notion of parsing in general, is as great an error, as that which some writers have adopted on the other hand, of making this exercise their sole process of inculcation, and supposing it may profitably supersede both the usual arrangement of the principles of grammar and the practice of explaining them by definitions. It is asserted in Parkhurst's "English Grammar for Beginners, on the Inductive Method of Instruction," that, "to teach the child a definition at the outset, is beginning at the wrong end;" that, "with respect to all that goes under the name of etymology in grammar, it is learned chiefly by practice in parsing, and scarcely at all by the aid of definitions."— Preface, pp. 5 and 6.

[57] Hesitation in speech may arise from very different causes. If we do not consider this, our efforts to remove it may make it worse. In most instances, however, it may be overcome by proper treatment, "Stammering," says a late author, "is occasioned by an over-effort to articulate; for when the mind of the speaker is so occupied with his subject as not to allow him to reflect upon his defect, he will talk without difficulty. All stammerers can sing, owing to the continuous sound, and the slight manner in which the consonants are touched in singing; so a drunken man can run, though he cannot walk or stand still."—Gardiner's Music of Nature, p. 30.

"To think rightly, is of knowledge; to speak fluently, is of nature; To read with profit, is of care; but to write aptly, is of practice." Book of Thoughts, p. 140.

[58] "There is nothing more becoming [to] a Gentleman, or more useful in all the occurrences of life, than to be able, on any occasion, to speak well, and to the purpose."—Locke, on Education, §171. "But yet, I think I may ask my reader, whether he doth not know a great many, who live upon their estates, and so, with the name, should have the qualities of Gentlemen, who cannot so much as tell a story as they should; much less speak clearly and persuasively in any business. This I think not to be so much their fault, as the fault of their education.—They have been taught Rhetoric, but yet never taught how to express themselves handsomely with their tongues or pens in the language they are always to use; as if the names of the figures that embellish the discourses of those who understood the art of speaking, were the very art and skill of speaking well. This, as all other things of practice, is to be learned, not by a few, or a great many rules given; but by EXERCISE and APPLICATION according to GOOD RULES, or rather PATTERNS, till habits are got, and a facility of doing it well."—Ib., §189. The forms of parsing and correcting which the following work supplies, are "patterns," for the performance of these practical "exercises;" and such patterns as ought to be implicitly followed, by every one who means to be a ready and correct speaker on these subjects.

[59] The principal claimants of "the Inductive Method" of Grammar, are Richard W. Green, Roswell C. Smith, John L. Parkhurst, Dyor H. Sanborn, Bradford Frazee, and, Solomon Barrett, Jr.; a set of writers, differing indeed in their qualifications, but in general not a little deficient in what constitutes an accurate grammarian.

[60] William C. Woodbridge edited the Journal, and probably wrote the article, from which the author of "English Grammar on the Productive System" took his "Preface."

[61] Many other grammars, later than Murray's, have been published, some in England, some in America, and some in both countries; and among these there are, I think, a few in which a little improvement has been made, in the methods prescribed for the exercises of parsing and correcting. In most, however, nothing of the kind has been attempted. And, of the formularies which have been given, the best that I have seen, are still miserably defective, and worthy of all the censure that is expressed in the paragraph above; while others, that appear in works not entirely destitute of merit, are absolutely much worse than Murray's, and worthy to condemn to a speedy oblivion the books in which they are printed. In lieu of forms of expression, clear, orderly, accurate, and full; such as a young parser might profitably imitate; such as an experienced one would be sure to approve; what have we? A chaos of half-formed sentences, for the ignorant pupil to flounder in; an infinite abyss of blunders, which a world of criticism could not fully expose! See, for example, the seven pages of parsing, in the neat little book entitled, "A Practical Grammar of the English Language, by the Rev. David Blair: Seventh Edition: London, 1815:" pp. 49 to 57. I cannot consent to quote more than one short paragraph of the miserable jumble which these pages contain. Yet the author is evidently a man of learning, and capable of writing well on some subjects, if not on this. "Bless the Lord, O my soul!" Form: "Bless, a verb, (repeat 97); active (repeat 99); active voice (102); infinitive mood (107); third person, soul being the nominative (118); present tense (111); conjugate the verb after the pattern (129); its object is Lord (99)."—Blair's Gram., p. 50. Of the paragraphs referred to, I must take some notice: "107. The imperative mood commands or orders or intreats."—Ib., p. 19. "118. The second person is always the pronoun thou or you in the singular, and ye or you in the plural."—Ib., p. 21. "111. The imperative mood has no distinction of tense: and the infinitive has no distinction of persons."—Ib., p. 20. Now the author should have said: "Bless is a redundant active-transitive verb, from bless, blessed or blest, blessing, blessed or blest; found in the imperative mood, present tense, second person, and singular number:" and, if he meant to parse the word syntactically, he should have added: "and agrees with its nominative thou understood; according to the rule which says, 'Every finite verb must agree with its subject or nominative, in person and number.' Because the meaning is—Bless thou the Lord." This is the whole story. But, in the form above, several things are false; many, superfluous; some, deficient; several, misplaced; nothing, right. Not much better are the models furnished by Kirkham, Smith, Lennie, Bullions, and other late authors.

[62] Of Dr. Bullions's forms of parsing, as exhibited in his English Grammar, which is a modification of Lennie's Grammar, it is difficult to say, whether they are most remarkable for their deficiencies, their redundancies, or their contrariety to other teachings of the same author or authors. Both Lennie and Bullions adopt the rule, that, "An ellipsis is not allowable when it would obscure the sentence, weaken its force, or be attended with an impropriety."—L., p. 91; B., p. 130. And the latter strengthens this doctrine with several additional observations, the first of which reads thus: "In general, no word should be omitted that is necessary to the full and correct construction, or even harmony of a sentence."—Bullions, E. Gr., 130. Now the parsing above alluded to, has been thought particularly commendable for its brevity—a quality certainly desirable, so far as it consists with the end of parsing, or with the more needful properties of a good style, clearness, accuracy, ease, and elegance. But, if the foregoing rule and observation are true, the models furnished by these writers are not commendably brief, but miserably defective. Their brevity is, in fact, such as renders them all bad English; and not only so, it makes them obviously inadequate to their purpose, as bringing into use but a part of the principles which the learner had studied. It consists only in the omission of what ought to have been inserted. For example, this short line, "I lean upon the Lord," is parsed by both of these gentlemen thus: "I, the first personal pronoun, masculine, or feminine, singular, the nominative—lean, a verb, neuter, first person singular, present, indicative—upon, a preposition—the, an article, the definite—Lord, a noun, masculine, singular, the objective, (governed by upon.)"—Lennie's Principles of English Gram., p. 51; Bullions's, 74. This is a little sample of their etymological parsing, in which exercise they generally omit not only all the definitions or "reasons" of the various terms applied, but also all the following particulars: first, the verb is, and certain definitives and connectives, which are "necessary to the full and correct construction" of their sentences; secondly, the distinction of nouns as proper or common; thirdly, the person of nouns, first, second, or third; fourthly, the words, number, gender, and case, which are necessary to the sense and construction of certain words used; fifthly, the distinction of adjectives as belonging to different classes; sixthly, the division of verbs as being regular or irregular, redundant or defective; seventhly, sometimes, (Lennie excepted,) the division of verbs as active, passive, or neuter; eighthly, the words mood and tense, which Bullions, on page 131, pronounces "quite unnecessary," and inserts in his own formule on page 132; ninthly, the distinction of adverbs as expressing time, place, degree, or manner; tenthly, the distinction of conjunctions as copulative or disjunctive; lastly, the distinction of interjections as indicating different emotions. All these things does their completest specimen of etymological parsing lack, while it is grossly encumbered with parentheses of syntax, which "must be omitted till the pupil get the rules of syntax."—Lennie, p. 51. It is also vitiated with several absurdities, contradictions, and improper changes of expression: as, "His, the third personal pronoun;" (B., p. 23;)—"me, the first personal pronoun;" (Id., 74;)—"A, The indefinite article;" (Id., 73;)—"a, an article, the indefinite;" (Id., 74;)—"When the verb is passive, parse thus: 'A verb active, in the passive voice, regular, irregular,' &c."—Bullions, p. 131. In stead of teaching sufficiently, as elements of etymological parsing, the definitions which belong to this exercise, and then dismissing them for the principles of syntax, Dr. Bullions encumbers his method of syntactical parsing with such a series of etymological questions and answers as cannot but make it one of the slowest, longest, and most tiresome ever invented. He thinks that the pupil, after parsing any word syntactically, "should be requested to assign a reason for every thing contained in his statement!"—Principles of E. Grammar, p. 131. And the teacher is to ask questions as numerous as the reasons! Such is the parsing of a text-book which has been pronounced "superior to any other, for use in our common schools"—"a complete grammar of the language, and available for every purpose for which Mr. Brown's can possibly be used."—Ralph K. Finch's Report, p, 12.

[63] There are many other critics, besides Murray and Alger, who seem not to have observed the import of after and before in connexion with the tenses. Dr. Bullions, on page 139th of his English Grammar, copied the foregoing example from Lennie, who took it from Murray. Even Richard Hiley, and William Harvey Wells, grammarians of more than ordinary tact, have been obviously misled by the false criticism above cited. One of Hiley's Rules of Syntax, with its illustration, stands thus: "In the use of the different tenses, we must particularly observe to use that tense which clearly and properly conveys the sense intended; thus, instead of saying, 'After I visited Europe, I returned to America;' we should say, 'After I had visited Europe, I returned to America."—Hiley's Gram., p. 90. Upon this he thought it needful to comment thus: "'After I visited Europe, I returned to America;' this sentence is incorrect; visited ought to be had visited, because the action implied by the verb visited WAS COMPLETED before the other past action returned."—Ib., p. 91. See nearly the same thing in Wells's School Grammar, 1st Edition, p. 151; but his later editions are wisely altered. Since "visited and was completed" are of the same tense, the argument from the latter, if it proves any thing, proves the former to be right, and the proposed change needless, or perhaps worse than needless. "I visited Europe before I returned to America," or, "I visited Europe, and afterwards returned to America," is good English, and not to be improved by any change of tense; yet here too we see the visiting "was completed before" the return, or HAD BEEN COMPLETED at the time of the return. I say, "The Pluperfect Tense is that which expresses what had taken place at some past time mentioned: as, 'I had seen him, when I met you.'" Murray says, "The Pluperfect Tense represents a thing not only as past, but also as prior to some other point of time specified in the sentence: as, I had finished my letter before he arrived." Hiley says, "The Past-Perfect expresses an action or event which was past before some other past action or event mentioned in the sentence, and to which it refers; as, I had finished my lessons before he came." With this, Wells appears to concur, his example being similar. It seems to me, that these last two definitions, and their example too, are bad; because by the help of before or after, "the past before the past" may be clearly expressed by the simple past tense: as, "I finished my letter before he arrived."—"I finished my lessons before he came." "He arrived soon after I finished the letter."—"Soon after it was completed, he came in."

[64] Samuel Kirkham, whose grammar is briefly described in the third chapter of this introduction, boldly lays the blame of all his philological faults, upon our noble language itself; and even conceives, that a well-written and faultless grammar cannot be a good one, because it will not accord with that reasonless jumble which he takes every existing language to be! How diligently he laboured to perfect his work, and with what zeal for truth and accuracy, may be guessed from the following citation: "The truth is, after all which can be done to render the definitions and rules of grammar comprehensive and accurate, they will still be found, when critically examined by men of learning and science, more or less exceptionable. These exceptions and imperfections are the unavoidable consequence of the imperfections of the language. Language as well as every thing else of human invention, will always be imperfect. Consequently, a perfect system of grammatical principles, would not suit it. A perfect grammar will not be produced, until some perfect being writes it for a perfect language; and a perfect language will not be constructed, until some super-human agency is employed in its production. All grammatical principles and systems which are not perfect are exceptionable."—Kirkham's Grammar, p. 66. The unplausible sophistry of these strange remarks, and the palliation they afford to the multitudinous defects of the book which contains them, may be left, without further comment, to the judgement of the reader.

[65] The phrase complex ideas, or compound ideas, has been used for the notions which we have of things consisting of different parts, or having various properties, so as to embrace some sort of plurality: thus our ideas of all bodies and classes of things are said to be complex or compound. Simple ideas are those in which the mind discovers no parts or plurality: such are the ideas of heat, cold, blueness, redness, pleasure, pain, volition, &c. But some writers have contended, that the composition of ideas is a fiction; and that all the complexity, in any case, consists only in the use of a general term in lieu of many particular ones. Locke is on one side of this debate, Horne Tooke, on the other.

[66] Dilworth appears to have had a true idea of the thing, but he does not express it as a definition; "Q. Is an Unit of one, a Number? A. An Unit is a number, because it may properly answer the question how many!"—Schoolmaster's Assistant, p. 2. A number in arithmetic, and a number in grammar, are totally different things. The plural number, as men or horses, does not tell how many; nor does the word singular mean one, as the author of a recent grammar says it does. The plural number is one number, but it is not the singular. "The Productive System" teaches thus: "What does the word singular mean? It means one."—Smith's New Gram., p. 7.

[67] It is truly astonishing that so great a majority of our grammarians could have been so blindly misled, as they have been, in this matter; and the more so, because a very good definition of a Letter was both published and republished, about the time at which Lowth's first appeared: viz., "What is a letter? A Letter is the Sign, Mark, or Character of a simple or uncompounded Sound. Are Letters Sounds? No. Letters are only the Signs or Symbols of Sounds, not the Sounds themselves."—The British Grammar, p. 3. See the very same words on the second page of Buchanan's "English Syntax," a work which was published as early as 1767.

[68] In Murray's octavo Grammar, this word is the in the first chapter, and their in the second; in the duodecimo, it is their in both places.

[69] "The definitions and the rules throughout the Grammar, are expressed with neatness and perspicuity. They are as short and comprehensive as the nature of the subject would admit: and they are well adapted both to the understanding and the memory of young persons."—Life of L. Murray, p. 245. "It may truly be said that the language in every part of the work, is simple, correct, and perspicuous."—Ib., p. 246.

[70] For this definition, see Murray's Gram., 8vo, p. 40; Duodecimo, 41; Smaller Gram., 18; Alger's, 18; Bacon's, 15; Frost's, 8, Ingersoll's, 17; A Teacher's, 8; Maltby's, 14; T. H. Miller's, 20; Pond's, 18; S. Putnam's, 15; Russell's, 11; Merchant's Murray, 25; and Worcester's Univ. and Crit. Dictionary. Many other grammarians have attempted to define number; with what success a few examples will show: (1.) "Number is the distinction of one from many."—W. Allen's Gram., p. 40; Merchant's School Gram., 28; Greenleaf's, 22; Nutting's, 17; Picket's, 19; D. Adams's, 31. (2.) "Number is the distinction of one from more."—Fisher's Gram., 51; Alden's, 7. (3.) "Number is the distinction of one from several or many."—Coar's Gram., p. 24. (4.) "Number is the distinction of one from more than one."—Sanborn's Gram., p. 24; J. Flint's, 27; Wells's, 52. (5.) "Number is the distinction of one from more than one, or many."—Grant's Latin Gram., p. 7. (6.) "What is number? Number is the Distinction of one, from two, or many."—British Gram., p. 89; Buchanan's, 16. (7.) "You inquire, 'What is number?' Merely this: the distinction of one from two, or many. Greek substantives have three numbers."—Bucke's Classical Gram., p. 38. All these authors say, that, in English, "there are two numbers, the singular and the plural." According to their explanations, then, we have two "distinctions of one from two, several, more, or many;" and the Greeks, by adding a dual number, have three! Which, then, of the two or three modifications or forms, do they mean, when they say, "Number is the distinction" &c.? Or, if none of them, what else is meant? All these definitions had their origin in an old Latin one, which, although it is somewhat better, makes doubtful logic in its application: "NUMERUS est, unius et multorum distinctio. Numeri igitur sunt duo; Singularis et Pluralis."— Ruddiman's Gram., p. 21. This means: (8.) "Number is a distinction of one and many. The numbers therefore are two; the Singular and the Plural." But we have yet other examples: as, (9.) "Number is the distinction of objects, as one or more."—Kirkham's Gram., p. 39. "The distinction of objects as one," is very much like "the consideration of an object as more than one." (10.) "Number distinguishes objects as one or more."—Cooper's Murray, p. 21; Practical Gram., p. 18. That is, number makes the plural to be either plural or singular for distinction's sake! (11.) "Number is the distinction of nouns with regard to the objects signified, as one or more."—Fisk's Murray, p. 19. Here, too, number has "regard" to the same confusion: while, by a gross error, its "distinction" is confined to "nouns" only! (12.) "Number is that property of a noun by which it expresses one or more than one."—Bullions's E. Gram., p. 12; Analyt. Gram., 25. Here again number is improperly limited to "a noun;" and is said to be one sign of two, or either of two, incompatible ideas! (13.) "Number shows how many are meant, whether one or more."—Smith's new Gram., p. 45. This is not a definition, but a false assertion, in which Smith again confounds arithmetic with grammar! Wheat and oats are of different numbers; but neither of these numbers "means a sum that may be counted," or really "shows how many are meant." So of "Man in general, Horses in general, &c."—Brightland's Gram., p. 77. (14.) "Number is the difference in a noun or pronoun, to denote either a single thing or more than one."—Davenport's Gram., p. 14. This excludes the numbers of a verb, and makes the singular and the plural to be essentially one thing. (15.) "Number is a modification of nouns and verbs, &c. according as the thing spoken of is represented, as, one or more, with regard to number."—Burn's Gram., p. 32. This also has many faults, which I leave to the discernment of the reader. (16.) "What is number? Number shows the distinction of one from many."—Wilcox's Gram., p. 6. This is no answer to the question asked; besides, it is obviously worse than the first form, which has "is," for "shows." (17.) "What is Number? It is the representation of objects with respect to singleness, or plurality." —O. B. Peirce's Gram., p. 34. If there are two numbers, they are neither of them properly described in this definition, or in any of the preceding ones. There is a gross misconception, in taking each or either of them to be an alternate representation of two incompatible ideas. And this sort of error is far from being confined to the present subject; it runs through a vast number of the various definitions contained in our grammars. (18.) "Number is the inflection of a noun, to indicate one object or more than one. Or, Number is the expression of unity or of more than unity."—Hiley's Gram., p. 14. How hard this author laboured to think what number is, and could not! (19.) "Number is the distinction of unity and plurality."—Hart's E. Gram., p. 40, Why say, "distinction;" the numbers, or distinctions, being two? (20.) "Number is the capacity of nouns to represent either one or more than one object."—Barrett's Revised Gram., p. 40. (21.) "Number is a property of the noun which denotes one or more than one."—Weld's Gram., 2d Ed., p. 55. (22.) "Number is a property of the noun or pronoun [,] by which it denotes one, or more than one."—Weld's Gram., Abridged Ed., p. 49. (23.) "Number is the property that distinguishes one from more than one."—Weld's Gram., Improved Ed., p. 60. This, of course, excludes the plural. (24.) "Number is a modification of nouns to denote whether one object is meant, or more than one."—Butler's Gram., p. 19. (25.) "Number is that modification of the Noun which distinguishes one from more than one."—Spencer's Gram., p. 26. Now, it is plain, that not one of these twenty-five definitions comports with the idea that the singular is one number and the plural an other! Not one of them exhibits any tolerable approach to accuracy, either of thought or of expression! Many of the grammarians have not attempted any definition of number, or of the numbers, though they speak of both the singular and the plural, and perhaps sometimes apply the term number to the distinction which is in each: for it is the property of the singular number, to distinguish unity from plurality: and of the plural, to distinguish plurality from unity. Among the authors who are thus silent, are Lily, Colet, Brightland, Harris, Lowth, Ash, Priestly, Bicknell, Adam, Gould, Harrison, Comly, Jaudon, Webster, Webber, Churchill, Staniford, Lennie, Dalton, Blair, Cobbett, Cobb, A. Flint, Felch, Guy, Hall, and S. W. Clark. Adam and Gould, however, in explaining the properties of verbs, say: "Number marks how many we suppose to be, to act, or to suffer."—A., 80; G., 78.

[71] These are the parts of speech in some late grammars; as, Barrett's, of 1854, Butler's, Covell's, Day's, Frazee's, Fowle's New, Spear's, Weld's, Wells's, and the Well-wishers'. In Frost's Practical Grammar, the words of the language are said to be "divided into eight classes," and the names are given thus: "Noun, Article, Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Preposition, Conjunction, and Interjection."—P. 29. But the author afterwards treats of the Adjective, between the Article and the Pronoun, just as if he had forgotten to name it, and could not count nine with accuracy! In Perley's Grammar, the parts of speech are a different eight: namely, "Nouns, Adjectives, Verbs, Adverbs, Prepositions, Conjunctions, Interjections, and Particles!"—P. 8. S. W. Clark has Priestley's classes, but calls Interjections "Exclamations."