The European Anarchy · Chapter 5The European Anarchy (5)
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"I replied that, 'if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that the casus foederis does not arise. It is an action that she undertakes on her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks of attacking her. It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.'"[2]
Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things. One, that Austria was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other, that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her. They were successful. Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided. The episode is as discreditable as you like to Austria. But, on the face of it, how does it discredit Germany? More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project was approved or supported by her ally.
The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left all the parties concerned dissatisfied. But, in particular, it left the situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more strained than ever. It was this situation that was the proximate cause of the present war. For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European war. For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible. The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace. "The diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse," says Baron Beyens, "applied itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at the Ballplatz." "The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest. As M. Zimmermann said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3]
[Footnote 1: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 240.]
[Footnote 2: It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti's statement, omits the references to Germany. See "Les causes et les consequences de la guerre," p. 101.]
[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," pp. 248, 262.]
15. Morocco.
Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco. The salient features here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries. For many years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British desire to maintain the status quo. But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French opposition to the British position in Egypt. The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition. By these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to fall to France. Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not communicated to her. But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced that the independence of Morocco was under German protection. The result was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers. Germany thereby obtained what she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation—the maintenance of the open door. But the French enterprise was not abandoned. Disputes with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, led to fresh military intervention. At the same time, it was difficult to secure the practical application of the principle of equal commercial opportunity. An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was found in practice not to work. The Germans pressed for its application to the new railways projected in Morocco. The French delayed, temporized, and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position in Morocco. The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez. Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital (a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country. The patience of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir. There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory in the French Congo. These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode. Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and intentions of the Powers concerned. Did Germany, for instance, intend to seize a share of Morocco when she sent the Panther to Agadir? And was that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention? Possibly, but by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting. If Germany had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the French Congo. Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in all the parties concerned.
The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel's book "Morocco in Diplomacy." The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various Powers. But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and straightforwardly.
The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war. Thus Baron Beyens writes:—
The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another war as a necessary evil.[4]
And again:—
The pacific settlement of the conflict of 1911 gave a violent impulse to the war party in Germany, to the propaganda of the League of Defence and the Navy League, and a greater force to their demands. To their dreams of hegemony and domination the desire for revenge against France now mingled its bitterness. A diplomatic success secured in an underground struggle signified nothing. War, war in the open, that alone, in the eyes of this rancorous tribe, could settle definitely the Moroccan question by incorporating Morocco and all French Africa in the colonial empire they hoped to create on the shores of the Mediterranean and in the heart of the Black Continent.[5]
This we may take to be a correct description of the attitude of the Pangermans. But there is no evidence that it was that of the nation. We have seen also that Baron Beyens' impression of the attitude of the German people, even after the Moroccan affair, was of a general desire for peace.[6] The crisis had been severe, but it had been tided over, and the Governments seem to have made renewed efforts to come into friendly relations. In this connection the following dispatch of Baron Beyens (June 1912) is worth quoting:—
After the death of Edward VII, the Kaiser, as well as the Crown Prince, when they returned from England, where they had been courteously received, were persuaded that the coldness in the relations of the preceding years was going to yield to a cordial intimacy between the two Courts and that the causes of the misunderstanding between the two peoples would vanish with the past. His disillusionment, therefore, was cruel when he saw the Cabinet of London range itself last year on the side of France. But the Kaiser is obstinate, and has not abandoned the hope of reconquering the confidence of the English.[7]
This dispatch is so far borne out by the facts that in the year succeeding the Moroccan crisis a serious attempt was made to improve Anglo-German relations, and there is no reason to doubt that on both sides there was a genuine desire for an understanding. How that understanding failed has already been indicated.[8] But even that failure did not ruin the relations between the two Powers. In the Balkan crisis, as we have seen and as is admitted on both sides, England and Germany worked together for peace. And the fact that a European conflagration was then avoided, in spite of the tension between Russia and Austria, is a strong proof that the efforts of Sir Edward Grey were sincerely and effectively seconded by Germany.[9]
[Footnote 1: See "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. XVI. A dispatch written by M. Leghait, the Belgian minister in Paris, on May 7, 1905, shows that rumour was busy on the subject. The secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish treaty were known to him, and these provided for an eventual partition of Morocco between France and Spain. He doubted whether there were secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty—"but it is supposed that there is a certain tacit understanding by which England would leave France sufficient liberty of action in Morocco under the reserve of the secret clauses of the Franco-Spanish arrangement, clauses if not imposed yet at least strongly supported by the London Cabinet."
We know, of course, now, that the arrangement for the partition was actually embodied in secret clauses in the Anglo-French treaty.]
[Footnote 2: According to M. Yves Guyot, when the Kaiser was actually on his way to Tangier, he telegraphed from Lisbon to Prince Bülow abandoning the project. Prince Bülow telegraphed back insisting, and the Kaiser yielded.]
[Footnote 3: See Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Chap. II. This account, by a Frenchman, will not be suspected of anti-French or pro-German bias, and it is based on French official records.]
[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 216.]
[Footnote 5: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 235.]
[Footnote 6: See above, p. 63.]
[Footnote 7: This view is reaffirmed by Baron Beyens in "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 29.]
[Footnote 8: See above, p. 79.]
[Footnote 9: Above, p. 111.]
16. The Last Years.
We have reached, then, the year 1913, and the end of the Balkan wars, without discovering in German policy any clear signs of a determination to produce a European war. We have found all the Powers, Germany included, contending for territory and trade at the risk of the peace of Europe; we have found Germany successfully developing her interests in Turkey; we have found England annexing the South African republics, France Morocco, Italy Tripoli; we have found all the Powers stealing in China, and in all these transactions we have found them continually on the point of being at one another's throats. Nevertheless, some last instinct of self-preservation has enabled them, so far, to pull up in time. The crises had been overcome without a war. Yet they had, of course, produced their effects. Some statesmen probably, like Sir Edward Grey, had had their passion for peace confirmed by the dangers encountered. In others, no doubt, an opposite effect had been produced, and very likely by 1913 there were prominent men in Europe convinced that war must come, and manoeuvring only that it should come at the time and occasion most favourable to their country. That, according to M. Cambon, was now the attitude of the German Emperor. M. Cambon bases this view on an alleged conversation between the Kaiser and the King of the Belgians.[1] The conversation has been denied by the German official organ, but that, of course, is no proof that it did not take place, and there is nothing improbable in what M. Cambon narrates.
The conversation is supposed to have occurred in November 1913, at a time when, as we have seen,[2] there was a distinct outburst in France of anti-German chauvinism, and when the arming and counter-arming of that year had exasperated opinion to an extreme degree. The Kaiser is reported to have said that war between Germany and France was inevitable. If he did, it is clear from the context that he said it in the belief that French chauvinism would produce war. For the King of the Belgians, in replying, is stated to have said that it was "a travesty, of the French Government to interpret it in that sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators." It should be observed also that this supposed attitude on the part of the Kaiser is noted as a change, and that he is credited with having previously stood for peace against the designs of the German Jingoes. His personal influence, says the dispatch, "had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace." The fact of a change of mind in the Kaiser is accepted also by Baron Beyens.
Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany, France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when, suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred.
First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe.
Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the negotiations had one object only—to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of war.
Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear. She was determined now, as in 1913, to have out her quarrel with Serbia, at the risk of a European war. Her guilt is clear and definite, and it is only the fact that we are not directly fighting her with British troops that has prevented British opinion from fastening upon it as the main occasion of the war.
But this time, quite clearly, Austria was backed by Germany. Why this change in German policy? So far as the Kaiser himself is concerned, there can be little doubt that a main cause was the horror he felt at the assassination of the Archduke. The absurd system of autocracy gives to the emotional reactions of an individual a preposterous weight in determining world-policy; and the almost insane feeling of the Kaiser about the sanctity of crowned heads was no doubt a main reason why Germany backed Austria in sending her ultimatum to Serbia. According to Baron Beyens, on hearing the news of the murder of the Archduke the Kaiser changed colour, and exclaimed: "All the effort of my life for twenty-five years must be begun over again!"[3] A tragic cry which indicates, what I personally believe to be the case, that it has been the constant effort of the Kaiser to keep the peace in Europe, and that he foresaw now that he would no longer be able to resist war.
So far, however, it would only be the war between Austria and Serbia that the Kaiser would be prepared to sanction. He might hope to avoid the European war. And, in fact, there is good reason to suppose that both he and the German Foreign Office did cherish that hope or delusion. They had bluffed Russia off in 1908. They had the dangerous idea that they might bluff her off again. In this connection Baron Beyens records a conversation with his colleague, M. Bollati, the Italian Ambassador at Berlin, in which the latter took the view that
at Vienna as at Berlin they were persuaded that Russia, in spite of the official assurances exchanged quite recently between the Tsar and M. Poincaré, as to the complete preparations of the armies of the two allies, was not in a position to sustain a European war and would not dare to plunge into so perilous an adventure.
Baron Beyens continues:—
At Berlin the opinion that Russia was unable to face a European war prevailed not only in the official world and in society, but among all the manufacturers who specialized in the construction of armaments. M. Krupp, the best qualified among them to express an opinion, announced on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]
But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested, there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military. The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed, as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a good moment … but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing," The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said, "Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July 26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:—
To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is unavoidable and near, an opinion which the Emperor has been induced to share. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party, might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not again present themselves for some time. Germany has finished the strengthening of her army which was decreed by the law of 1912, and, on the other hand, she feels that she cannot carry on indefinitely a race in armaments with Russia and France which would end by her ruin. The Wehrbeitrag has been a disappointment for the Imperial Government, to whom it has demonstrated the limits of the national wealth. Russia has made the mistake of making a display of her strength before having finished her military reorganization. That strength will not be formidable for several years: at the present moment it lacks the railway lines necessary for its deployment. As to France, M. Charles Humbert has revealed her deficiency in guns of large calibre, but apparently it is this arm that will decide the fate of battles. For the rest, England, which during the last two years Germany has been trying, not without some success, to detach from France and Russia, is paralysed by internal dissensions and her Irish quarrels.[6]
It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th. On the other hand, as late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had been working throughout for peace. Describing an interview he had had on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:—
From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed… A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events. It was the ultimatum from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war.[7]
Why was that ultimatum sent? According to the German apologists, it was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the critical moment, and so made war inevitable. There is, indeed, no doubt that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by mobilization and rumours of mobilization. The danger was clearly pointed out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd to his Government:—
As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian troops, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure. For in that event the purely military consideration of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of control.[8]
On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case. Moreover, in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to Germany. However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger. We do not definitely know. What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that precipitated the war.
We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:—
As no reply had been received from St. Petersburg by noon the next day [after the dispatch of the German ultimatum], MM. de Jagow and Zimmermann (I have it from the latter) hurried to the Chancellor and the Kaiser to prevent the issue of the order for general mobilization, and to persuade his Majesty to wait till the following day. It was the last effort of their dying pacifism, or the last awakening of their conscience. Their efforts were broken against the irreducible obstinacy of the Minister of War and the army chiefs, who represented to the Kaiser the disastrous consequences of a delay of twenty-four hours.[10]
[Footnote 1: French Yellow Book, No. 6. In "L'Allemagne avant la guerre" (p. 24) Baron Beyens states that this conversation was held at Potsdam on November 5th or 6th; the Kaiser said that war between Germany and France was "inevitable and near." Baron Beyens, presumably, is the authority from whom M. Cambon derives his information.]
[Footnote 2: Above, p. 25.]
[Footnote 3: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 273.]
[Footnote 4: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 280 seq.]
[Footnote 5: See "L'Enigme Allemande," p. 96.]
[Footnote 6: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 8.]
[Footnote 7: Second Belgian Grey Book, No. 52.]
[Footnote 8: Austrian Red Book, No. 28.]
[Footnote 9: See Chapter 14.]
[Footnote 10: "L'Allemagne avant la guerre," p. 301.]
17. The Responsibility and the Moral.
It will be seen from this brief account that so far as the published evidence goes I agree with the general view outside Germany that the responsibility for the war at the last moment rests with the Powers of Central Europe. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which there can be no reasonable doubt was known to and approved by the German Government, was the first crime. And it is hardly palliated by the hope, which no well-informed men ought to have entertained, that Russia could be kept out and the war limited to Austria and Serbia. The second crime was the German ultimatum to Russia and to France. I have no desire whatever to explain away or palliate these clear facts. But it was not my object in writing this pamphlet to reiterate a judgment which must already be that of all my readers. What I have wanted to do is to set the tragic events of those few days of diplomacy in their proper place in the whole complex of international politics. And what I do dispute with full conviction is the view which seems to be almost universally held in England, that Germany had been pursuing for years past a policy of war, while all the other Powers had been pursuing a policy of peace. The war finally provoked by Germany was, I am convinced, conceived as a "preventive war." And that means that it was due to the belief that if Germany did not fight then she would be compelled to fight at a great disadvantage later. I have written in vain if I have not convinced the reader that the European anarchy inevitably provokes that state of mind in the Powers, and that they all live constantly under the threat of war. To understand the action of those who had power in Germany during the critical days it is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in the preceding pages: the general situation, which grouped the Powers of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse than the one before. I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of war. But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper and more general—the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy.