The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus · Chapter 12Part 12
This chapter is not translated yet. You are reading the original.
The reasons I have given, why the Apostles did not directly attack slavery, do not apply to the abolitionists. The arm of civil power does not restrain us from attacking it. To open our lips against the policy and institutions of civil government is not certain death. A despotic government restricted the efforts of the Apostles to do good. But we live under governments which afford the widest scope for exertions to bless our fellow men and honor God. Now, if we may not avail ourselves of this advantage, simply because the Apostles did not have it to avail themselves of, then whatever other interests may prosper under a republican government, certain it is, that the cause of truth and righteousness is not to be benefited by it. Far better never to have had our boasted form of government, if, whilst it extends the freedom and multiplies the facilities of the wicked, it relieves the righteous of none of the restrictions of a despotic government. Again, there is a religious conscience all over this land, and an enlightened and gospel sense of right and wrong; on which we can and do (as in your Introduction you concede is the fact) bring our arguments against slavery to bear with mighty power. But, on the other hand, the creating of such a conscience and such a sense, in the heathen and semi-heathen amongst whom they lived and labored, was the first, and appropriate, and principal work of the Apostles. To employ, therefore, no other methods for the moral and religious improvement of the people of the United States, than were employed by the Apostles for that of the people of the Roman empire, is as absurd as it would be to put the highest and lowest classes in a school to the same lessons; or a raw apprentice to those higher branches of his trade which demand the skill of an experienced workman.
I am here reminded of what Professor Hodge says were the means relied on by the Saviour and Apostles for abolishing slavery. "It was," says he, "by teaching the true nature, dignity, equality, and destiny of men; by inculcating the principles of justice and love; and by leaving these principles to produce their legitimate effects in ameliorating the condition of all classes of society." I would not speak disparagingly of such a course of instruction; so far from it, I am ready to admit that it is indispensable for the removal of evils, in every age and among every people. When general instructions of this character shall have ceased to be given, then will all wholesome reforms have ceased also. But, I cannot approve of the Professor's object in this remark. This object is to induce his readers to believe, that these abstract and general instructions are all that is needed to effect the termination of slavery. Now, I maintain that one thing more is wanting; and that is, the application of these instructions—of the principles contained in them—to the evil in hand. As well may it be supposed, that the mechanic can accomplish his work without the application, and by the mere possession, of his tools, as that a given reformation can be effected by unapplied general principles. Of these principles, American philanthropists have been possessed from time immemorial; and yet all the while American slavery has been flourishing and growing strong. Of late, however, these principles have been brought to bear upon the system, and it manifestly is already giving way. The groans of the monster prove that those rays of truth, which did not disturb him whilst they continued to move in the parallel lines of abstractions and generalities, make it quite too hot for him since they are converged to a burning focus upon his devoted head. Why is it, for example, that the influence of the Boston Recorder and New-York Observer—why is it, that the influence of most of our titled divines—is decidedly hostile to the abolition of slavery? It is not because they are deficient in just general sentiments and principles respecting man's duties to God and his fellow man. It is simply because they stand opposed to the application of these sentiments and principles to the evil in question; or, in other words, stand opposed to the Anti-Slavery Society, which is the chosen lens of Divine Providence for turning these sentiments and principles, with all the burning, irresistible power of their concentration, against a giant wickedness. What is the work of the Temperance Societies, but to make a specific application of general truths and principles to the vice of intemperance? And the fact, that from the time of Noah's intoxication, until the organization of the American Temperance Society, the desolating tide of intemperance had been continually swelling, proves that this reliance on unapplied principles, however sound—this "faith without works"—is utterly vain. Nathan found that nothing, short of a specific application of the principles of righteousness, would answer in the case of the sin of adultery. He had to abandon all generalities and circuitousness, and come plump upon the royal sinner with his "Thou art the man." Those divines, whose policy it is to handle slaveholders "with gloves," if they must handle them at all, doubtless regard Nathan as an exceedingly impolite preacher.
But, not only is it far less difficult to instruct the people of the United States than it was the people of the Roman Empire, in the sin of slavery; it is also—for the reason that the sin is ours, to a far greater extent, than it was theirs—much more important for us than for them to be instructed in it. They had no share in the government which upheld it. They could not abolish it by law. But, on the other hand, the people of the United States are themselves the government of their country. They are the co-sovereigns of their nation. They uphold slavery by law, and they can put it down by law. In this point of view, therefore, slavery is an incomparably greater sin in us, than it was in them.
Only one other reason will be given why it is more needful to overthrow American, than it was to overthrow Roman slavery. The Church was then but a handful of "strangers scattered throughout" the heathen world. It was made up of those who had little influence, and who were esteemed "the filth of the world, and the offscouring of all things." It had, probably, little, if any thing, to do with slavery, except to suffer its rigors in the persons of many of its members. But here, the Church, comprising no very small proportion of the whole population, and exerting a mighty influence for good or ill on the residue, is tainted, yes, rotten with slavery. In this contrast, we not only see another reason why the destruction of American slavery is more important than was that of Roman slavery; but we also see, that the Apostles could have been little, if at all, actuated by that motive, which is more urgent than any other in the breasts of the American abolitionists—the motive of purging the Church of slavery.
To return to what you say of the abominations and horrors of Greek and Roman slavery:—I should be doing you great injustice, were I to convey the idea that you approve of them. It is admitted that you disapprove of them; and, it is also admitted, that no responsibility for them rests on the relation of slaveholder and slave, if that relation have, as you labor to show, the stamp of Divine approbation. You say, that slavery, like marriage, is an institution sanctioned by the New Testament; and that, therefore, neither for the evils which attend it, nor for any other cause, is it to be argued against. This is sound reasoning, on your part; and, if your premises are correct, there is no resisting your deduction. We are, in that case, not only not to complain of the institution of slavery, but we are to be thankful for it. Considering, however, that the whole fabric of your argument, in the principal or New Testament division of your book, is based on the alleged fact that the New Testament approves of slavery, it seems to me that you have contented yourself, and sought to make your readers contented, with very slender evidences of the truth of this proposition. These evidences are, mainly—that the New Testament does not declare slavery to be a sin: and, that the Apostles enjoin upon masters and servants their respective duties; and this, too, in the same connexion in which they make similar injunctions upon those who stand in the confessedly proper relations of life—the husband and wife, the parent and child. Your other evidences, that the New Testament approves of slavery, unimportant as they are, will not be left unnoticed.
I have attempted to show, that the omission of the New Testament to declare slavery to be a sin, is not proof that it is not a sin. I pass on to show, that the Apostolic injunction of duties upon masters and servants does not prove that slavery is sinless.
I have now reached another grand fallacy in your book. It is also found in Professor Hodge's article. You, gentlemen, take the liberty to depart from our standard English translation of the Bible, and to substitute "slaveholder" for "master"—"slave" for "servant"—and, in substance, "emperor" for "ruler"—and "subject of an imperial government" for "subject of civil government generally." I know that this substitution well suits your purposes: but, I know not by what right you make it. Professor Hodge tells the abolitionists, certainly without much respect for either their intelligence or piety, that "it will do no good (for them) to attempt to tear the Bible to pieces." There is but too much evidence, that he himself has not entirely refrained from the folly and crime, which he is so ready to impute to others.
I will proceed to offer some reasons for the belief, that when the Apostles enjoined on masters and servants their respective duties, they had reference to servitude in general, and not to any modification of it.
1st. You find passages in the New Testament, where you think despotes refers to a person who is a slaveholder, and doulos to a person who is a slave. Admit that you are right: but this (which seems to be your only ground for it) does not justify you in translating these words "slaveholder" and "slave," whenever it may be advantageous to your side of the question to have them thus translated. These words, have a great variety of meanings. For instance, there are passages in the New Testament where despotes means "God"—Jesus Christ"—Head of a family:" and where doulos means "a minister or agent"—a subject of a king"—a disciple or follower of Christ." Despotes and doulos are the words used in the original of the expression: "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace:" doulos in that of the expressions, "servant of Christ," and "let him be servant of all." Profane writers also use these words in various senses. My full belief is, that these words were used in both a generic and special sense, as is the word corn, which denotes bread-stuffs in general, and also a particular kind of them; as is the word meat, the meaning of which is, sometimes, confined to flesh that is eaten, and, at other times, as is frequently the case in the Scriptures, extends to food in general; and, as is the word servant, which is suitable, either in reference to a particular form of servitude, or to servitude in general. There is a passage in the second chapter of Acts, which is, of itself, perhaps, sufficient to convince an unbiased mind, that the Apostles used the word doulos in a, generic, as well as in a special sense. Doulos and doule are the words in the phrase: "And on my servants and on my handmaidens." A reference to the prophecy as it stands; in Joel 2: 28, 29, makes it more obvious, that persons in servitude are referred to under the words doulos and doule; and, that the predicted blessing was to be shed upon persons of all ages, classes, and conditions—upon old men and young men—upon sons and daughters—and upon man-servants and maid-servants. But, under the interpretation of those, who, like Professor Hodge and yourself, confine the meaning of doulos and doule to a species of servants, the prophecy would have reference to persons of all ages, classes, and conditions—excepting certain descriptions of servants. Under this interpretation, we are brought to the absurd conclusion, that the spirit is to be poured out upon the master and his slaves—but not upon his hired servants.
I trust that enough has been said, under this my first head, to show that the various senses in which the words despotes and doulos are employed, justify me in taking the position, that whenever we meet with them, we are to determine, from the nature of the case, and from the connexion in which they are used, whether they refer to servitude in general, or to a species of it.
2d. The confinement of the meaning of the words in question supposes, what neither religion nor common sense allows us to suppose, that slaveholders and slaves, despots and those in subjection to them, were such especial favorites of the Apostles, as to obtain from them specific instructions in respect to their relative duties, whilst all other masters and servants, and all other rulers and subjects, throughout all future time, were left unprovided with such instructions. According to this supposition, when slavery and despotism shall, agreeably to Professor Hodge's expectations, have entirely ceased, there will be not one master nor servant, not one ruler nor subject in the whole earth, to fall, as such, under the Apostolic injunctions.
3d. You admit that there were hirelings, in a community of primitive believers; and I admit, for the moment, that there were slaves in it. Now, under my interpretation of the Apostolic injunction, all husbands, all wives, all parents, all children, and all servants, in this community, are told their respective duties: but, under yours, these duties are enjoined on all husbands, all wives, all parents, all children, and a part of the servants. May we not reasonably complain of your interpretation, that it violates analogy?
Imagine the scene, in which a father, in the Apostolic age, assembles his family to listen to a letter from the glowing Peter, or "such an one as Paul the aged." The letter contains instructions respecting the relative duties of life. The venerable pair, who stand in the conjugal and parental relations, receive, with calm thankfulness, what is addressed to themselves;—the bright-eyed little ones are eager to know what the Apostle says to children—a poor slave blesses God for his portion of the Apostolic counsel;—and the scene would be one of unmingled joy, if the writer had but addressed hired servants, as well as slaves. One of the group goes away to weep, because the Apostle had remembered the necessities of all other classes of men, and forgotten those of the hireling. Sir, do you believe that the Apostle was guilty of such an omission? I rejoice that my side of the question between us, does not call for the belief of what is so improbable and unnatural—and, withal, so dishonoring to the memory of the Apostle.
4th. Another reason for believing, that the Apostles intended no such limitation as that which you impose upon their words, is, that their injunctions are as applicable to the other classes of persons occupying these relations, as they are to the particular class to which you confine them. The hired servant, as well as the slave, needs to be admonished of the sins of "eye service" and "purloining;" and the master of voluntary, as well as involuntary servants, needs to be admonished to "give that which is just and equal." The ruler in a republic, or, in a limited monarchy, as well as the despot, requires to be reminded, that he is to be "a minister of God for good." So the subject of one kind of civil government, as well as that of another, needs to be told to be "subject unto the higher powers."
I need not extend my remarks to prove, that despotes and doulos are, in the case before us, to be taken in their comprehensive sense of master and servant: and, clearly, therefore, the abolitionist is not guilty of violating your rule, "not to interfere with a civil relation (in another place, you say, 'any of the existing relations of life') for which, and to regulate which, either Christ or his Apostles have prescribed regulations." He believes, as fully as yourself, that the relation of master and servant is approved of God. It is the slavery modification of it—the slaveholder's abuse and perversion of the relation, in reducing the servant to a chattel—which, he believes, is not approved of God.
For the sake of the argument, I will admit, that the slave alone, of all classes of servants, was favored with specific instructions from the Apostles: and then, how should we account for the selection? In no other way, can I conceive, than, on the ground, that his lot is so peculiarly hard—so much harder than that of persons under other forms of servitude—that he needs, whilst they do not, Apostolic counsel and advice to keep him just, and patient, and submissive. Let me be spared from the sin of reducing a brother man to such a lot. Your doctrine, therefore, that the Apostles addressed slaves only, and not servants in general, would not, were its correctness admitted, lift you out of all the difficulties in your argument.
Again, does it necessarily follow from this admission, that the relation of slaveholder and slave is sinless? Was the despotism of the Roman government sinless? I do not ask whether the abuses of civil government, in that instance, were sinless. But, I ask, was a government, despotic in its constitution, depriving all its subjects of political power, and extending absolute control over their property and persons—was such a government, independently of the consideration of its abuses, (if indeed we may speak of the abuses of what is in itself an abuse,) sinless? I am aware, that Prof. Hodge says, that it was so: and, when he classes despotism and slavery with adiaphora, "things indifferent;" and allows no more moral character to them than to a table or a broomstick, I trust no good man envies his optics. May I not hope that you, Mr. Smylie, perceive a difference between despotism and an "indifferent thing." May I not hope, that you will, both as a Republican and a Christian, take the ground, that despotism has a moral character, and a bad one? When our fathers prayed, and toiled, and bled, to obtain for themselves and their children the right of self-government, and to effect their liberation from a power, which, in the extent and rigor of its despotism, is no more to be compared to the Roman government, than the "little finger" to the "loins," I doubt not, that they felt that despotism had a moral, and a very bad moral character. And so would Prof. Hodge have felt, had he stood by their side, instead of being one of their ungrateful sons. I say ungrateful—for, who more so, than he who publishes doctrines that disparage the holy cause in which they were embarked, and exhibits them, as contending for straws, rather than for principles? Tell me, how long will this Republic endure after our people shall have imbibed the doctrine, that the nature of civil government is an indifferent thing: and that the poet was right when he said,
"For forms of government let fools contest?"
This, however, is but one of many doctrines of ruinous tendency to the cause of civil liberty, advanced by pro-slavery writers to sustain their system of oppression.
It would surely be superfluous to go into proofs, that the Roman government was vicious and wicked in its constitution and nature. Nevertheless, the Apostle enjoined submission to it, and taught its subjects how to demean themselves under it. Here, then, we have an instance, in which we cannot argue the sinlessness of a relation, from the fact of Apostolic injunctions on those standing in it. Take another instance. The Chaldeans went to a foreign land, and enslaved its people—as members of your guilty partnership have done for some of the slaves you now own, and for the ancestors of others. And God destroyed the Chaldeans expressly "for all their evil that they had done in Zion." But, wicked as they were, for having instituted this relation between themselves and the Jews, God, nevertheless, tells the Jews to submit to it. He tells them, "Serve the King of Babylon." He even says, "seek the peace of the city, whither I have caused you to be carried away captives, and pray unto the Lord for it; for, in the peace thereof, shall ye have peace." Here then, we have another instance, in addition to that of the Roman despot and his subjects, in which the Holy Spirit prescribed regulations for wicked relations. You will, at least, allow, that the relation established by the Chaldeans between themselves and the captive Jews, was wicked. But, you will perhaps say, that this is not a relation coming within the contemplation of your rule. Your rule speaks of a civil relation, and also of the existing relations of life. But, the relation in question, being substantially that of slaveholder and slave, is, according to your own showing, a civil relation. Perhaps you will say, it is not an "existing relation of life." But what do you mean by "an existing relation of life?" Do you mean, that it is a relation approved of God? If you do, and insist that the relation of slaveholder and slave is "an existing relation of life," then you are guilty of begging the great question between us. Your rule, therefore, can mean nothing more than this—that any relation is rightful, for which the Bible prescribes regulations. But the relation referred to between the Chaldeans and Jews, proves the falsity of the rule. Again, when a man compels me to go with him, is not the compelled relation between him and me a sinful one? And the relation of robber and robbed, which a man institutes between himself and me, is not this also sinful? But, the Bible has prescribed regulations for the relations in both these cases. In the one, it requires me to "go with him twain;" and, in the other, to endure patiently even farther spoliation and, "let him have (my) cloak also." In these cases, also, do we see the falsity of your rule—and none the less clearly, because the relations in question are of brief duration.
Before concluding my remarks on this topic, let me say, that your doctrine, that God has prescribed no rules for the behaviour of persons in any other than the just relations of life, reflects no honor on His compassion. Why, even we "cut-throat" abolitionists are not so hard-hearted as to overlook the subjects of a relation, because it is wicked. Pitying, as we do, our poor colored brethren, who are forced into a wicked relation, which, by its very nature and terms, and not by its abuses, as you would say, has robbed them of their all—even we would, nevertheless, tell them to "resist not evil"—to be obedient unto their own masters"—not purloining, but showing all good fidelity." We would tell them, as God told the captive Jews, to "seek the peace of those, whither they are carried away captives, and to pray unto the Lord" for them: and our hope of their emancipation is not, as it is most slanderously and wickedly reported to be, in their deluging the South with blood: but, it is, to use again those sweet words of inspiration, that "in the peace thereof they shall have peace." We do not communicate with the slave; but, if we did, we would teach him, that our hope of his liberation is grounded largely in his patience, and that, if he would have us drop his cause from our hands, he has but to take it into his own, and attempt to accomplish by violence, that which we seek to effect through the power of truth and love on the understanding and heart of his master.
Having disposed of your reasons in favor of the rightfulness of the relation of slaveholder and slave, I will offer a few reasons for believing that it is not rightful.
1st. My strongest reason is, that the great and comprehensive principles, and the whole genius and spirit of Christianity, are opposed to slavery.
2d. In the case of Pharoah and his Jewish slaves, God manifested his abhorrence of the relation of slavery. The fact that the slavery in this case was political, instead of domestic, and, therefore, of a milder type than that of Southern slavery, does not forbid my reasoning from the one form to the other. Indeed, if I may receive your declaration on this point, for the truth, I need not admit that the type of the slavery in question is milder than that of Southern slavery;—for you say, that "their (the Jews) condition was that of the most abject bondage or slavery." But the supposition that it is milder, being allowed to be correct, would only prove, that God's abhorrence of Southern bondage as much exceeds that which he expressed of Egyptian bondage, as the one system is more full than the other of oppression and cruelty.
We learn from the Bible, that it was not because of the abuses of the Egyptian system of bondage, but, because of its sinful nature, that God required its abolition. He did not command Pharaoh to cease from the abuses of the system, and to correct his administration of it, but to cease from the system itself. "I have heard," says God, "the groaning of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians keep in bondage;"—not whom the Egyptians, availing themselves of their absolute power, compel to make brick without straw, and seek to waste and exterminate by the murder of their infant children;—but simply "whom the Egyptians keep in bondage." These hardships and outrages were but the leaves and branches. The root of the abomination was the bondage itself, the assertion of absolute and slaveholding power by "a new king over Egypt, which knew not Joseph." In the next verse God says: "I will rid you"—not only from the burdens and abuses, as you would say, of bondage,—but "out of their (the Egyptians) bondage" itself—out of the relation in which the Egyptians oppressively and wickedly hold you.
God sends many messages to Pharaoh. In no one of them does He reprove him for the abuses of the relation into which he had forced the Jews. In no one of them is he called on to correct the evils which had grown out of that relation. But, in every one, does God go to the root of the evil, and command Pharaoh, "let my people go"—"let my people go, that they may serve me." The abolitionist is reproachfully called an "ultraist" and "an immediatist." It seems that God was both, when dealing with this royal slaveholder:—for He commanded Pharaoh, not to mitigate the bondage of the Israelites, but to deliver them from it—and that, too, immediately. The system of slavery is wicked in God's sight, and, therefore, did He require of Pharaoh its immediate abandonment. The phrase, "let my people go, that they may serve me," shows most strikingly one feature of resemblance between Egyptian and American slavery. Egyptian slavery did not allow its subjects to serve God, neither does American. The Egyptian master stood between his slave and their God: and how strikingly and awfully true is it, that the American master occupies the like position! Not only is the theory of slavery, the world over, in the face of God's declaration; "all souls are mine:" but American slaveholders have brought its practical character to respond so fully to its theory—they have succeeded, so well, in excluding the light and knowledge of God from the minds of their slaves—that they laugh at His claim to "all souls."
3d. Paul, in one of his letters to the Corinthian Church, tells servants—say slaves, to suit your views—if they may be free, to prefer freedom to bondage. But if it be the duty of slaves to prefer freedom to bondage, how clearly is it the correlative duty of the master to grant it to him! You interpret the Apostle's language, in this case, as I do; and it is not a little surprising, that, with your interpretation of it, you can still advocate slavery. You admit, that Paul says—I use your own words—"a state of freedom, on the whole, is the best." Now, it seems to me, that this admission leaves you without excuse, for defending slavery. You have virtually yielded the ground. And this admission is especially fatal to your strenuous endeavors to class the relation of master and slave with the confessedly proper relations of life, and to show that, like these, it is approved of God. Would Paul say to the child, "a state of freedom" from parental government "on the whole is the best?" Would he say to the wife, "a state of freedom from your conjugal bonds" on the whole is the best? Would he say to the child and wife, in respect to this freedom, "use it rather?" Would he be thus guilty of attempting to annihilate the family relation?