Hiero · Chapter 4A Discourse on Despotic Rule (3)
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(14) Lit. "Honours would seem to be the outcome and expression of conditions utterly remote from these, in fact their very opposites." (15) Cf. Napoleon's accost of Goethe, "Vous etes un homme," and "as Goethe left the room, Napoleon repeated to Berthier and Daru, 'Voila un homme!'" ("The Life of Goethe," Lewes, p. 500). (16) Reading {koines}, which ought to mean "common to them and him"; if with Cobet {koine}, "in public crown him for his virtue's sake, a benefactor." (17) Or, "without reproach."
Now when Simonides had listened to these reasonings to the end, (18) he answered: How is it, Hiero, if to play the tyrant is a thing so villainous, (19) and that is your final judgment, how comes it you are not quit of so monstrous an evil? Neither you, nor, for that matter, any monarch else I ever heard of, having once possessed the power, did ever of his own free will divest himself of sovereignty. How is that, Hiero?
(18) Cf. "Econ." xi. 1. (19) Or, "if to monarchise and play the despot."
For one simple reason (the tyrant answered), and herein lies the supreme misery of despotic power; it is not possible even to be quit of it. (20) How could the life of any single tyrant suffice to square the account? How should he pay in full to the last farthing all the moneys of all whom he has robbed? with what chains laid upon him make requital to all those he has thrust into felons' quarters? (21) how proffer lives enough to die in compensation of the dead men he has slain? how die a thousand deaths?
(20) Holden aptly cf. Plut. "Sol." 14, {kalon men einai ten torannida khorion, ouk ekhein de apobasin}, "it was true a tyrrany was a very fair spot, but it had no way down from it" (Clough, i. p. 181). (21) Or, "how undergo in his own person the imprisonments he has inflicted?" Reading {antipaskhoi}, or if {antiparaskhoi}, transl. "how could he replace in his own person the exact number of imprisonments which he has inflicted on others?"
Ah, no! Simonides (he added), if to hang one's self outright be ever gainful to pour mortal soul, then, take my word for it, that is the tyrant's remedy: there's none better suited (22) to his case, since he alone of all men is in this dilemma, that neither to keep nor lay aside his troubles profits him.
(22) Or, "nought more profitable to meet the case." The author plays on {lusitelei} according to his wont.
VIII
Here Simonides took up the thread of the discourse (1) as follows: That for the moment, Hiero, you should be out of heart regarding tyranny (2) I do not wonder, since you have a strong desire to be loved by human beings, and you are persuaded that it is your office which balks the realisation of your dream.
(1) Al. "took up the speaker thus." (2) "In reference to despotic rule."
Now, however, I am no less certain I can prove to you that government (3) implies no obstacle to being loved, but rather holds the advantage over private life so far. And whilst investigating if this be really so, let us not embarrass the inquiry by asking whether in proportion to his greater power the ruler is able to do kindness on a grander scale. But put it thus: Two human beings, the one in humble circumstances, (4) the other a despotic ruler, perform a common act; which of these twain will, under like conditions, (5) win the larger thanks? I will begin with the most trifling (6) examples; and first a simple friendly salutation, "Good day," "Good evening," dropped at sight of some one from the lips of here a ruler, there a private citizen. In such a case, whose salutation will sound the pleasanter to him accosted?
(3) {to arkhein}. Cf. "Cyrop." passim. (4) "A private person." (5) Lit. "by like expenditure of power." (6) {arkhomai soi}. Lit. "I'll begin you with quite commonplace examples." Holden cf. Shakesp. "Merry Wives," i. 4. 97, "I'll do you your master what good I can"; "Much Ado," ii. 3. 115, "She will sit you." For the distinction between {paradeigmaton} = examples and {upodeigmata} = suggestions see "Horsem." ii. 2.
Or again, (7) let us suppose that both should have occasion to pronounce a panegyric. Whose compliments will carry farther, in the way of delectation, think you? Or on occasion of a solemn sacrifice, suppose they do a friend the honour of an invitation. (8) In either case it is an honour, but which will be regarded with the greater gratitude, the monarch's or the lesser man's?
(7) "Come now." (8) Cf. "Mem." II. iii. 11 as to "sacrifices as a means of social enjoyment." Dr. Holden cf. Aristot. "Nic. Eth." VIII. ix. 160, "And hence it is that these clan communities and hundreds solemnise sacrifices, in connection with which they hold large gatherings, and thereby not only pay honour to the gods, but also provide for themselves holiday and amusement" (R. Williams). Thuc. ii. 38, "And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular games and sacrifices throughout the year" (Jowett). Plut. "Them." v., {kai gar philothuten onta kai lampron en tais peri tous xenous dapanais ...} "For loving to sacrifice often, and to be splendid in his entertainment of strangers, he required a plentiful revenue" (Clough, i. 236). To which add Theophr. "Char." xv. 2, "The Shameless Man": {eita thusas tois theois autos men deipnein par' etero, ta de krea apotithenai alsi pasas, k.t.l.}, "then when he has been sacrificing to the gods, he will put away the salted remains, and will himself dine out" (Jebb).
Or let a sick man be attended with a like solicitude by both. It is plain, the kind attentions of the mighty potentate (9) arouse in the patient's heart immense delight. (10)
(9) "Their mightinesses," or as we might say, "their serene highnesses." Cf. Thuc. ii. 65. (10) "The greatest jubilance."
Or say, they are the givers of two gifts which shall be like in all respects. It is plain enough in this case also that "the gracious favour" of his royal highness, even if halved, would more than counterbalance the whole value of the commoner's "donation." (11)
(11) Or, "half the great man's 'bounty' more than outweighs the small man's present." For {dorema} cf. Aristot. "N. E." I. ix. 2, "happiness... a free gift of God to men."
Nay, as it seems to me, an honour from the gods, a grace divine, is shed about the path of him the hero-ruler. (12) Not only does command itself ennoble manhood, but we gaze on him with other eyes and find the fair within him yet more fair who is to-day a prince and was but yesterday a private citizen. (13) Again, it is a prouder satisfaction doubtless to hold debate with those who are preferred to us in honour than with people on an equal footing with ourselves.
(12) Lit. "attends the footsteps of the princely ruler." Cf. "Cyrop." II. i. 23, Plat. "Laws," 667 B, for a similar metaphorical use of the word. (13) {to arkhein}, "his princely power makes him more noble as a man, and we behold him fairer exercising rule than when he functioned as a common citizen." Reading {kallio}, or if {edion}, transl. "we feast our eyes more greedily upon him."
Why, the minion (with regard to whom you had the gravest fault to find with tyranny), the favourite of a ruler, is least apt to quarrel (14) with gray hairs: the very blemishes of one who is a prince soon cease to be discounted in their intercourse. (15)
(14) Lit. "feels least disgust at age"; i.e. his patron's years and wrinkles. (15) Cf. Plat. "Phaedr." 231 B.
The fact is, to have reached the zenith of distinction in itself lends ornament, (16) nay, a lustre effacing what is harsh and featureless and rude, and making true beauty yet more splendid.
(16) Or, "The mere prestige of highest worship helps to adorn." See Aristot. "N. E." xi. 17. As to {auto to tetimesthai m. s.} I think it is the {arkhon} who is honoured by the rest of men, which {time} helps to adorn him. Others seem to think it is the {paidika} who is honoured by the {arkhon}. If so, transl.: "The mere distinction, the privilege alone of being highly honoured, lends embellishment," etc.
Since then, by aid of equal ministrations, you are privileged to win not equal but far deeper gratitude: it would seem to follow, considering the vastly wider sphere of helpfulness which lies before you as administrators, and the far grander scale of your largesses, I say it naturally pertains to you to find yourselves much more beloved than ordinary mortals; or if not, why not?
Hiero took up the challenge and without demur made answer: For this good reason, best of poets, necessity constrains us, far more than ordinary people, to be busybodies. We are forced to meddle with concerns which are the very fount and springhead of half the hatreds of mankind.
We have moneys to exact if we would meet our necessary expenses. Guards must be impressed and sentinels posted wherever there is need of watch and ward. We have to chastise evil-doers; we must put a stop to those who would wax insolent. (17) And when the season for swift action comes, and it is imperative to expedite a force by land or sea, at such a crisis it will not do for us to entrust the affair to easy-goers.
(17) Or, "curb the over-proud in sap and blood."
Further than that, the man who is a tyrant must have mercenaries, and of all the burdens which the citizens are called upon to bear there is none more onerous than this, since nothing will induce them to believe these people are supported by the tyrant to add to his and their prestige, (18) but rather for the sake of his own selfishness and greed.
(18) Reading with Breit. {eis timas}, or if the vulg. {isotimous}, transl. "as equal merely to themselves in privilege"; or if with Schenkl (and Holden, ed. 3) {isotimias}, transl. "their firm persuasion is these hirelings are not supported by the tyrant in the interests of equality but of undue influence."
IX
To these arguments Simonides in turn made answer: Nay, Hiero, I am far from stating that you have not all these divers matters to attend to. They are serious duties, (1) I admit. But still, what strikes me is, if half these grave responsibilities do lend themselves undoubtedly to hatred, (2) the remaining half are altogether gratifying. Thus, to teach others (3) arts of highest virtue, and to praise and honour each most fair performance of the same, that is a type of duty not to be discharged save graciously. Whilst, on the other hand, to scold at people guilty of remissness, to drive and fine and chasten, these are proceedings doubtless which go hand in hand with hate and bitterness.
(1) Cf. "Econ." vii. 41. (2) Or, "tend indisputably to enmity." (3) Or, "people," "the learner."
What I would say then to the hero-ruler is: Wherever force is needed, the duty of inflicting chastisement should be assigned to others, but the distribution of rewards and prizes must be kept in his own hands. (4)
(4) Cf. "Cyrop." VIII. ii. 27; ib. i. 18; "Hipparch," i. 26.
Common experience attests the excellence of such a system. (5) Thus when we (6) wish to set on foot a competition between choruses, (7) it is the function of the archon (8) to offer prizes, whilst to the choregoi (9) is assigned the duty of assembling the members of the band; (10) and to others (11) that of teaching and applying force to those who come behindhand in their duties. There, then, you have the principle at once: The gracious and agreeable devolves on him who rules, the archon; the repellent counterpart (12) on others. What is there to prevent the application of the principle to matters politic in general? (13)
(5) Or, "current incidents bear witness to the beauty of the principle." (6) {emin}. The author makes Simonides talk as an Athenian. (7) Lit. "when we wish our sacred choirs to compete." (8) Or, "magistrate"; at Athens the Archon Eponymos. See Boeckh, "P. E. A." p. 454 foll. Al. the {athlethetai}. See Pollux, viii. 93; cf. Aeschin. "c. Ctes." 13. (9) Or more correctly at Athens the choragoi = leaders of the chorus. (10) i.e. the choreutai. (11) Sc. the choro-didaskaloi, or chorus-masters. (12) {ta antitupa}, "the repellent obverse," "the seamy side." Cf. Theogn. 1244, {ethos ekhon solion pistios antitupon}. "Hell." VI. iii. 11. (13) Or, "Well then, what reason is there why other matters of political concern—all other branches of our civic life, in fact—should not be carried out on this same principle?"
All states as units are divided into tribes ({thulas}), or regiments ({moras}), or companies ({lokhous}), and there are officers ({arkhontes}) appointed in command of each division. (14)
(14) e.g. Attica into ten phylae, Lacedaemon into six morae, Thebes and Argos into lochi. See Aristot. "Pol." v. 8 (Jowett, i. 166); "Hell." VI. iv. 13; VII. ii. 4.
Well then, suppose that some one were to offer prizes (15) to these political departments on the pattern of the choric prizes just described; prizes for excellence of arms, or skill in tactics, or for discipline and so forth, or for skill in horsemanship; prizes for prowess (16) in the field of battle, bravery in war; prizes for uprightness (17) in fulfilment of engagements, contracts, covenants. If so, I say it is to be expected that these several matters, thanks to emulous ambition, will one and all be vigorously cultivated. Vigorously! why, yes, upon my soul, and what a rush there would be! How in the pursuit of honour they would tear along where duty called: with what promptitude pour in their money contributions (18) at a time of crisis.
(15) See "Revenues," iii. 3; A. Zurborg, "de. Xen. Lib. qui {Poroi} inscribitur," p. 42. (16) Cf. "Hell." III. iv. 16; IV. ii. 5 foll. (17) "In reward for justice in, etc." See "Revenues," l.c.; and for the evil in question, Thuc. i. 77; Plat. "Rep." 556. (18) {eispheroien}, techn. of the war-tax at Athens. See "Revenues," iii. 7 foll.; iv. 34 foll.; Thuc. iii. 19; Boeckh, "P. E. A." pp. 470, 539. Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. 11. 10, in illustration of the tyrant's usual method of raising money.
And that which of all arts is the most remunerative, albeit the least accustomed hitherto to be conducted on the principle of competition (19)—I mean agriculture—itself would make enormous strides, if some one were to offer prizes in the same way, "by farms and villages," to those who should perform the works of tillage in the fairest fashion. Whilst to those members of the state who should devote themselves with might and main to this pursuit, a thousand blessings would be the result. The revenues would be increased; and self-restraint be found far more than now, in close attendance on industrious habits. (20) Nay further, crimes and villainies take root and spring less freely among busy workers.
(19) Al. "and what will be the most repaying... being a department of things least wont," etc. (20) Or, "soundness of soul much more be found allied with occupation."
Once more, if commerce (21) is of any value to the state, then let the merchant who devotes himself to commerce on the grandest scale receive some high distinction, and his honours will draw on other traders in his wake.
(21) Cf. "Revenues," l.c.
Or were it made apparent that the genius who discovers a new source of revenue, which will not be vexatious, will be honoured, by the state, a field of exploration will at once be opened, which will not long continue unproductive. (22)
(22) Lit. "that too is an inquiry which will not long lie fallow."
And to speak compendiously, if it were obvious in each department that the introducer of any salutary measure whatsoever will not remain unhonoured, that in itself will stimulate a host of pople who will make it their business to discover some good thing or other for the state. Wherever matters of advantage to the state excite deep interest, of necessity discoveries are made more freely and more promptly perfected. But if you are afraid, O mighty prince, that through the multitude of prizes offered (23) under many heads, expenses also must be much increased, consider that no articles of commerce can be got more cheaply than those which people purchase in exchange for prizes. Note in the public contests (choral, equestrian, or gymnastic) (24) how small the prizes are and yet what vast expenditure of wealth and toil, and painful supervision these elicit. (25)
(23) Reading {protithemenon} with Cobet. (24) Lit. "hippic, gymnic, and choregic contests." (25) e.g. "in the choral dances (1) money on the part of the choragoi; (2) pains on the part of the choreutai; (3) supervising care on the part of the choro-didaskoi, and so mutatis mutandis of the hippic and gymnic."
X
And Hiero replied: Thus far you reason prettily, methinks, Simonides; but about these mercenary troops have you aught to say? Can you suggest a means to avoid the hatred of which they are the cause? Or will you tell me that a ruler who has won the affection of his subjects has no need for body-guards?
Nay, in good sooth (replied Simonides), distinctly he will need them none the less. I know it is with certain human beings as with horses, some trick of the blood they have, some inborn tendency; the more their wants are satisfied, the more their wantonness will out. Well then, to sober and chastise wild spirits, there is nothing like the terror of your men-at-arms. (1) And as to gentler natures, (2) I do not know by what means you could bestow so many benefits upon them as by means of mercenaries.
(1) Lit. "spear-bearers"; the title given to the body-guard of kings and tyrants. (2) Lit. "the beautiful and good," the {kalois kagathois}. See "Econ." vi. 11 foll.
Let me explain: You keep them, I presume, in the first instance, for yourself, as guards of your own person. But for masters, owners of estates and others, to be done to death with violence by their own slaves is no unheard-of thing. Supposing, then, the first and foremost duty laid on mercenary troops were this: they are the body-guards of the whole public, and bound as such to come to the assistance of all members of the state alike, in case they shall detect some mischief brewing (3) (and miscreants do spring up in the hearts of states, as we all know); I say then, if these mercenary troops were under orders to act as guardians of the citizens, (4) the latter would recognise to whom they were indebted.
(3) "If they become aware of anything of that sort." Is not this modelled on the {krupteia}? See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," ch. viii. "Lacedaemon," p. 186. (4) Or, "as their police." {toutous}, sc. "the citizens"; al. "the evil-doers." If so, transl. "to keep watch and ward on evil-doers; the citizens would soon recognise the benefit they owe them for that service."
But in addition to these functions, such a body might with reason be expected to create a sense of courage and security, by which the country labourers with their flocks and herds would greatly benefit, a benefit not limited to your demesne, but shared by every farm throughout the rural district.
Again, these mercenaries, if set to guard strategic points, (5) would leave the citizens full leisure to attend to matters of more private interest.
(5) Or, "as garrisons of critical positions," like Phyle or Decelia near Athens.
And again, a further function: Can you conceive a service better qualified to gain intelligence beforehand and to hinder the secret sudden onslaughts of a hostile force, than a set of troopers always under arms and fully organised? (6)
(6) Or, "trained to act as one man." See Sturz, s.v.
Moreover, on an actual campaign, where will you find an arm of greater service to the citizens than these wage-earning troops? (7) than whom, it is likely, there will none be found more resolute to take the lion's share of toil or peril, or do outpost duty, keeping watch and ward while others sleep, brave mercenaries.
(7) The author is perhaps thinking of some personal experiences. He works out his theory of a wage-earning militia for the protection of the state in the "Cyropaedia." See esp. VII. v. 69 foll.
And what will be the effect on the neighbour states conterminous with yours? (8) Will not this standing army lead them to desire peace beyond all other things? In fact, a compact force like this, so organised, will prove most potent to preserve the interests of their friends and to damage those of their opponents.
(8) Or, "that lie upon your borders," as Thebes and Megara were "nigh-bordering" to Athens. Cf. Eur. "Rhes." 426; Soph. "Fr." 349.
And when, finally, the citizens discover it is not the habit of these mercenaries to injure those who do no wrong, but their vocation rather is to hinder all attempts at evil-doing; whereby they exercise a kindly providence and bear the brunt of danger on behalf of the community, I say it must needs be, the citizens will rejoice to pay the expenses which the force entails. At any rate, it is for objects of far less importance that at present guards (9) are kept in private life.
(9) "Police or other."
XI
But, Hiero, you must not grudge to spend a portion of your private substance for the common weal. For myself, I hold to the opinion that the sums expended by the monarch on the state form items of disbursement more legitimate (1) than those expended on his personal account. But let us look into the question point by point.
(1) {eis to deon}. Holden cf. "Anab." I. iii. 8. Aristoph. "Clouds," 859, {osper Periklees eis to deon apolesa}: "Like Pericles, for a necessary purpose, I have lost them."
First, the palace: do you imagine that a building, beautified in every way at an enormous cost, will afford you greater pride and ornament than a whole city ringed with walls and battlements, whose furniture consists of temples and pillared porticoes, (2) harbours, market-places?
(2) Reading {parastasi}, properly "pillasters" (Poll. i. 76. 10. 25) = "antae," hence "templum in antis" (see Vitruv. iii. 2. 2); or more widely the entrance of a temple or other building. (Possibly the author is thinking of "the Propylea").Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 415; "I. T." 1159. = {stathmoi}, Herod. i. 179; Hom. "Il." xiv. 167; "Od." vii. 89, {stathmoi d' argureoi en khalkeo estasan oudio}. The brazen thresholds both sides did enfold Silver pilasters, hung with gates of gold (Chapman). Al. {pastasi}, = colonnades.
Next, as to armaments: Will you present a greater terror to the foe if you appear furnished yourself from head to foot with bright emlazonrie and horrent arms; (3) or rather by reason of the warlike aspect of a whole city perfectly equipped?
(3) Or, "with armour curiously wrought a wonder and a dread." {oplois tois ekpaglotatois}, most magnificent, awe-inspiring, a poetical word which appears only in this passage in prose (Holden). L. & S. cf. Hom. "Il." i. 146, xxi. 589, of persons; "Od." xiv. 552, of things. Pind. "Pyth." iv. 140; "Isth." 7 (6), 30.
And now for ways and means: On which principle do you expect your revenues to flow more copiously—by keeping your own private capital (4) employed, or by means devised to make the resources of the entire state (5) productive?
(4) Reading {idia}, al. {idia}, = "your capital privately employed." (5) Lit. "of all citizens alike," "every single member of the state."
And next to speak of that which people hold to be the flower of institutions, a pursuit both noble in itself and best befitting a great man—I mean the art of breeding chariot-horses (6)—which would reflect the greater lustre on you, that you personally (7) should train and send to the great festal gatherings (8) more chariots than any Hellene else? or rather that your state should boast more racehorse-breeders than the rest of states, that from Syracuse the largest number should enter to contest the prize?
(6) Cf. Plat. "Laws," 834 B. (7) Breit. cf. Pind. "Ol." i. 82; "Pyth." i. 173; ii. 101; iii. 96. (8) "Our solemn festivals," e.g. those held at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, Nemea.
Which would you deem the nobler conquest—to win a victory by virtue of a chariot, or to achieve a people's happiness, that state of which you are the head and chief? And for my part, I hold it ill becomes a tyrant to enter the lists with private citizens. For take the case he wins, he will not be admired, but be envied rather, when is is thought how many private fortunes go to swell the stream of his expenditure; while if he loses, he will become a laughing-stock to all mankind. (9)
(9) Or, "you will be mocked and jeered at past all precedence," as historically was the fate of Dionysus, 388 or 384 B.C. (?); and for the possible connection between that incident and this treatise see Lys. "Olymp."; and Prof. Jebb's remarks on the fragment, "Att. Or." i. p. 203 foll. Grote, "H. G." xi. 40 foll.; "Plato," iii. 577.
No, no! I tell you, Hiero, your battlefield, your true arena is with the champion presidents of rival states, above whose lesser heads be it your destiny to raise this state, of which you are the patron and supreme head, to some unprecedented height of fortune, which if you shall achieve, be certain you will be approved victorious in a contest the noblest and the most stupendous in the world.
Since what follows? In the first place, you will by one swift stroke have brought about the very thing you have set your heart on, you will have won the affection of your subjects. Secondly, you will need no herald to proclaim your victory; not one man only, but all mankind, shall hymn your virtue.
Wherever you set foot you shall be gazed upon, and not by individual citizens alone, but by a hundred states be warmly welcomed. You shall be a marvel, not in the private circle only, but in public in the sight of all.
It shall be open to you, so far as safety is concerned, to take your journey where you will to see the games or other spectacles; or it shall be open to you to bide at home, and still attain your object.
Before you shall be gathered daily an assembly, a great company of people willing to display whatever each may happen to possess of wisdom, worth, or beauty; (10) and another throng of persons eager to do you service. Present, regard them each and all as sworn allies; or absent, know that each and all have one desire, to set eyes on you.
(10) Or, "to display their wares of wisdom, beauty, excellence."
The end will be, you shall not be loved alone, but passionately adored, by human beings. You will not need to woo the fair but to endure the enforcement of their loving suit.
You shall not know what fear is for yourself; you shall transfer it to the hearts of others, fearing lest some evil overtake you. You will have about you faithful lieges, willing subjects, nimble servitors. You shall behold how, as a matter of free choice, they will display a providential care for you. And if danger threatens, you will find in them not simply fellow-warriors, but champions eager to defend you with their lives. (11)
(11) Not {summakhoi}, but {promakhoi}.
Worthy of many gifts you shall be deemed, and yet be never at a loss for some well-wisher with whom to share them. You shall command a world-wide loyalty; a whole people shall rejoice with you at your good fortunes, a whole people battle for your interests, as if in very deed and truth their own. Your treasure-houses shall be coextensive with the garnered riches of your friends and lovers.
Therefore be of good cheer, Hiero; enrich your friends, and you will thereby heap riches on yourself. Build up and aggrandise your city, for in so doing you will gird on power like a garment, and win allies for her. (12)
(12) Some commentators suspect a lacuna at this point.
Esteem your fatherland as your estate, the citizens as comrades, your friends as your own children, and your sons even as your own soul. And study to excel them one and all in well-doing; for if you overcome your friends by kindness, your enemies shall nevermore prevail against you.
Do all these things, and, you may rest assured, it will be yours to own the fairest and most blessed possession known to mortal man. You shall be fortunate and none shall envy you. (13)
(13) Al. "It shall be yours to be happy and yet to escape envy." The concluding sentence is gnomic in character and metrical in form. See "Pol. Lac." xv. 9.