A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents. Volume 3, part 2: Martin Van Buren · Chapter 19Special Messages. (7)
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"Seventh. He declares that neither the line of boundary claimed by Great Britain nor that claimed by the United States can be adjudged as the true line without departing from the principles of equity and justice as between the two parties."
It was the opinion of His Majesty's Government, Sir Charles alleged, that the decisions of the arbiter upon the second and third points referred to him, as well as upon the subordinate questions, ought to be acquiesced in by the two Governments, and that in any future attempt to establish a boundary, whether in strict conformity with the words of the treaty of 1783 or by agreeing to the mode of settlement recommended by the arbiter, it would be necessary to adopt these seven decisions as a groundwork for further proceedings; that the British Government, therefore, previously to any further negotiation, claimed from the Government of the United States an acquiescence in the decisions pronounced by the arbiter upon all those points which he had decided, and as a preliminary to any attempt to settle the remaining point by negotiation to be satisfied that the Federal Government was possessed of the necessary powers to carry into effect any arrangement upon which the two parties might agree.
With respect to the proposition made by the American Government, Sir Charles thought that the difficulty which was found insurmountable as against the line recommended by the King of the Netherlands, viz., the want of authority to agree to any line which might imply a cession of any part of the territory to which the treaty as hitherto interpreted by the United States might appear to entitle one of the component States of the Union, would be equally fatal to that suggested by Mr. Livingston, since a line drawn from the head of the St. Croix to highlands found to the westward of the meridian of that spot would not be the boundary of the treaty and might be more justly objected to by Maine and with more appearance of reason than that proposed by the arbiter.
The reply of Mr. McLane to the preceding note is dated on the 11th of March. He expressed his regret that His Britannic Majesty's Government should still consider any part of the opinion of the arbiter obligatory on either party. Those opinions, the Secretary stated, could not have been carried into effect by the President without the concurrence of the Senate, who, regarding them not only as not determining the principal object of the reference, but as in fact deciding that object to be impracticable, and therefore recommending to the two parties a boundary not even contemplated either by the treaty or by the reference nor within the power of the General Government to take, declined to give their advice and consent to the execution of the measures recommended by the arbiter, but did advise the Executive to open a new negotiation for the ascertainment of the boundary in pursuance of the treaty of 1783, and the proposition of Mr. Livingston, submitted in his letter of 30th of April, 1833, accordingly proceeded upon that basis. Mr. McLane denied that a decision, much less the expression of an opinion, by the arbiter upon some of the disputed points, but of a character not to settle the real controversy, was binding upon either party, and he alleged that the most material point in the line of the true boundary, both as it respects the difficulty of the subject and the extent of territory and dominions of the respective Governments, the arbiter not only failed to decide, but acknowledged his inability to decide, thereby imposing upon both Governments the unavoidable necessity of resorting to further negotiation to ascertain the treaty boundary and absolving each party from any obligation to adopt his recommendations. The Secretary also declined to admit that of the three main points referred to the arbiter as necessary to ascertain the boundary of the treaty he had decided two. On the first point, Mr. McLane said, it was not contended a decision was made or that either the angle or the highlands called for by the treaty was found, and on the third point an opinion merely was expressed that it would be suitable to proceed to fresh operations to measure the observed latitude, etc.
The Secretary admitted that if the American proposition should be acceded to by His Majesty's Government and the commission hereafter to be appointed should result in ascertaining the true situation of the boundary called for by the treaty of 1783, that it would be afterwards necessary, in order to ascertain the true line, to settle the other two points according to which it should be traced. He therefore offered, if the American proposition should be acceded to, notwithstanding the obligatory effect of the decision of the arbiter on the point is denied, "to take the stream situated farthest to the northwest among those which fall into the northernmost of the three lakes, the last of which bears the name of Connecticut Lake, as the north-westernmost head of the Connecticut River according to the treaty of 1783;" and as it respects the third point referred to the arbiter, the line of boundary on the forty-fifth degree of latitude, but upon which he failed to decide, the President would agree, if the proposition as to the first point was embraced, to adopt the old line surveyed and marked by Valentine and Collins in 1771 and 1772.
The Secretary then proceeded to state further and insuperable objections to an acquiescence by the United States in the opinions supposed to have been pronounced by the arbiter in the course of his reasoning upon the first point submitted to him. He remarked that the views expressed by the arbiter on these subordinate matters could not be regarded as decisions within the meaning of the reference, but rather as postulates or premises, by which he arrived at the opinion expressed in regard to the point in dispute. By an acquiescence in them, therefore, as required by Great Britain, the United States would reject as erroneous the conclusion of the arbiter, whilst they would adopt the premises and reasoning by which it was attained—that the seven postulates or premises presented as necessary to be considered by the United States are but part of those on which the arbiter was equally explicit in the expression of his views, that on others his reasoning might be considered as more favorable to the pretensions of this Government, and that no reason was perceived why an acquiescence in his opinions upon them should not equally apply to all the premises assumed by him and be binding upon both parties. Mr. McLane was, however, persuaded that there was no obligation on either Government to acquiesce in the opinion of the arbiter on any of the matters involved in his premises; that such acquiescence would defeat the end of the present negotiation, and that as it appeared to be mutually conceded that the arbiter had not been able to decide upon the first and most material point so as to make a binding decision, there could certainly be no greater obligation to yield to his opinions on subordinate matters merely. The Secretary further observed that the most material point of the three submitted to the arbiter was that of the highlands, to which the President's proposition directly applies, and which are designated in the treaty of peace as the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the St. Croix River to the highlands dividing the rivers, etc.; that the arbiter found it impossible to decide this point, and therefore recommended a new line, different from that called for by the treaty of 1783, and which could only be established by a conventional arrangement between the two Governments; that the Government of the United States could not adopt this recommendation nor agree upon a new and conventional line without the consent of the State of Maine; that the present negotiation proposed to ascertain the boundary according to the treaty of 1783, and for this purpose, however attained, the authority of the Government of the United States was complete; that the proposition offered by the Government of the United States promised, in the opinion of the President, the means of ascertaining the true line by discovering the highlands of the treaty, but the British Government asked the United States as a preliminary concession to acquiesce in the opinion of the arbiter upon certain subordinate facts—a concession which would in effect defeat the sole object, not only of the proposition, but of the negotiation, viz, the determination of the boundary according to the treaty of 1783 by confining the negotiation to a conventional line, to which this Government had not the authority to agree. Mr. McLane also said that if by a resort to the plain rule now recommended it should be found impracticable to trace the boundary according to the definitive treaty, it would then be time enough to enter upon a negotiation for a conventional substitute for it. He stated in answer to the suggestion of Sir Charles R. Vaughan that the objection urged against the line of the arbiter would equally lie against that suggested by Mr. Livingston; that the authority of the Government to ascertain the true line of the treaty was unquestionable, and that the American proposition, by confining the course to the natural object, would be a legitimate ascertainment of that line.
In a note dated 16th March Sir Charles R. Vaughan offered some observations upon the objections on the part of the United States to acquiesce in the points previously submitted to the American Government. He said that the adoption of the views of the British Government by the Government of the United States was meant to be the groundwork of future proceedings, whether those proceedings were to be directed to another attempt to trace the boundary as proposed by the latter or to a division of the territory depending upon the conventional line. He maintained that the arbiter had decided, as the British Government asserted, two out of the three main points submitted for his decision, viz, what ought to be considered as the northwesternmost head of the Connecticut (but which the Government of the United States is only willing to admit conditionally) and the point relative to tracing the boundary along the forty-fifth degree of latitude. This point, he observed, Mr. McLane wished to dispose of by adopting the old line of Collins and Valentine, which was suspected of great inaccuracy by both parties, and the only motive for retaining which was because some American citizens have made settlements upon territory that a new survey might throw into the possession of Great Britain. Sir Charles denied that the acquiescence of the United States in the seven subordinate points lately submitted by His Majesty's Government would confine the negotiation to a conventional line, to which the President had no authority to agree, and affirmed that not a step could be taken by the commissioners to be appointed according to Mr. Livingston's proposition, notwithstanding the unlimited discretion which it was proposed to give them, unless the two Governments agreed upon two of the seven subordinate points—"the character of the land they are to discover as dividing waters according to the treaty of 1783 and what are to be considered as Atlantic rivers." In answer to Mr. McLane's observation that on many points the reasoning of the arbiter had been more favorable to the United States than to Great Britain, and that therefore acquiescence should equally apply to all the premises assumed, Sir Charles expressed his confidence that if acquiescence in them could facilitate the object which now occupied both Governments they would meet with the most favored consideration. Sir Charles adverted to the obligations contracted under the seventh article of the convention, to the opinion of His Majesty's Government that they were binding and its willingness to abide by the award of the arbiter. He referred to the small majority by which he supposed the award to have been defeated in the Senate of the United States and a new negotiation advised to be opened, to the complicated nature of the plan proposed by the United States for another attempt to trace the boundary of the treaty, to the rejection of the points proposed by the British Government to render that plan more practicable, etc., and regretted sincerely that the award of the arbiter, which conferred upon the United States three-fifths of the disputed territory, together with Rouses Point—a much greater concession than is ever likely to be obtained by a protracted negotiation—was set aside. An alleged insuperable constitutional difficulty having occasioned the rejection of the award, Sir Charles wished to ascertain previously to any further proceedings how far the General Government had the power to carry into effect any arrangement resulting from a new negotiation, the answer of Mr. McLane upon this point having been confined to stating that should a new commission of survey, freed from the restriction of following the due north line of the treaty, find anywhere westward of that line highlands separating rivers according to the treaty of 1783, a line drawn from the monument at the source of the St. Croix would be such a fulfillment of the terms of that treaty that the President could agree to make it the boundary without reference to the State of Maine.
Mr. McLane, under date of 21st March, corrected the error into which Sir Charles had fallen in regard to the proceedings on the award in the Senate of the United States, and showed that that body not only failed, but by two repeated votes of 35 and 34 to 8 refused, to consent to the execution of the award, and by necessary implication denied its binding effect upon the United States, thus putting it out of the power of the President to carry it into effect and leaving the high parties to the submission situated precisely as they were prior to the selection of the arbiter.
The President had perceived, Mr. McLane said, in all the previous efforts to adjust the boundary in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1783 that a natural and uniform rule in the settlement of disputed questions of location had been quite overlooked; that the chief, if not only, difficulty arose from a supposed necessity of finding highlands corresponding with the treaty description in a due north line from the monument, but it was plain that if such highlands could be anywhere discovered it would be a legal execution of the treaty to draw a line to them from the head of the St. Croix without regard to the precise course given in the treaty. It therefore became his duty to urge the adoption of this principle upon the Government of His Britannic Majesty as perhaps the best expedient which remained for ascertaining the boundary of the treaty of 1783. The Secretary could not perceive in the plan proposed anything so complicated as Sir Charles appeared to suppose. On the contrary, it was recommended to approbation and confidence by its entire simplicity. It chiefly required the discovery of the highlands called for by the treaty, and the mode of reaching them upon the principle suggested was so simple that no observations could make it plainer. The difficulty of discovering such highlands, Mr. McLane said, was presumed not to be insuperable. The arbiter himself was not understood to have found it impracticable to discover highlands answering the description of the highlands of the treaty, though unable to find them due north from the monument; and certainly it could not be more difficult for commissioners on the spot to arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to their own judgment as to the locality of the highlands.
Mr. McLane, in answer to Sir Charles's request for information on the subject, stated that the difficulty in the way of the adoption of the line recommended by the arbiter was the want of authority in the Government of the United States to agree to a line not only confessedly different from the line called for by the treaty, but which would deprive the State of Maine of a portion of territory to which she would be entitled according to the line of the definitive treaty; that by the President's proposition a commission would be raised, not to establish a new line differing from the treaty of 1783, but to determine what the true and original boundary was and in which of the two disagreeing parties the right to the disputed territory originally was; that for this purpose the authority of the original commissioners, if they could have agreed, was complete under the Ghent treaty, and that of the new commission proposed to be constituted could not be less.
Sir Charles R. Vaughan explained, under date of the 24th of March, with regard to his observation "that the mode in which it was proposed by the United States to settle the boundary was complicated; that he did not mean to apply it to the adoption of a rule in the settlement of disputed questions of location, but to the manner in which it is proposed by the United States that the new commission of survey shall be selected and constituted."
On the 8th of December, 1834, Sir Charles R. Vaughan transmitted a note to the Department of State, in which, after a passing expression of the regret of His Majesty's Government that the American Government still declined to come to a separate understanding on the several points of difference with respect to which the elements of decision were fully before both Governments, but without abandoning the argument contained in his note of 10th February last, he addressed himself exclusively to the American proposition for the appointment of a new commission to be empowered to seek westward of the meridian of the St. Croix highlands answering to the description of those mentioned in the treaty of 1783. He stated with regard to the rule of surveying on which the proposition was founded that however just and reasonable it might be, His Majesty's Government did not consider it so generally established and recognized as Mr. McLane assumed it to be; that, indeed, no similar case was recollected in which the principle asserted had been put in practice; yet, on the contrary, one was remembered not only analogous to that under discussion, but arising out of the same article of the same treaty, in which the supposed rule was invested by the agents of the American Government itself; that the treaty of 1783 declared that the line of boundary was to proceed from the Lake of the Woods "in a due west course to the Mississippi," but it being ascertained that such a line could never reach that river, since its sources lie south of the latitude of the Lake of the Woods, the commissioners, instead of adhering to the natural object—the source of the Mississippi—and drawing a new connecting line to it from the Lake of the Woods, adhered to the arbitrary line to be drawn due west from the lake and abandoned the Mississippi, the specific landmark mentioned in the treaty.
Sir Charles further stated that if the President was persuaded that he could carry out the principle of surveying he had proposed without the consent of Maine, and if no hope remained, as was alleged by Mr. McLane, of overcoming the constitutional difficulty in any other way until at least this proposition should have been tried and have failed, His Majesty's Government, foregoing their own doubts on the subject, were ready to acquiesce in the proceeding proposed by the President if that proceeding could be carried into effect in a manner not otherwise objectionable; that "His Majesty's Government would consider it desirable that the principles on which the new commissioners would have to conduct their survey should be settled beforehand by a special convention between the two Governments;" that there was, indeed, one preliminary question upon which it was obviously necessary the two Governments should agree before the commission could begin their survey with any chance of success, viz, What is the precise meaning to be attached to the words employed in the treaty to define the highlands which the commissioners are to seek for? that those highlands are to be distinguished from other highlands by the rivers flowing from them, and those distinguishing rivers to be known from others by the situation of their mouths; that with respect to the rivers flowing south into the Atlantic Ocean a difference of opinion existed between the two Governments; that whilst the American Government contended that rivers falling into the Bay of Fundy were, the British Government contended that they were not, for the purposes of the treaty, rivers falling into the Atlantic Ocean, and that the views and arguments of the British Government on this point had been confirmed by an impartial authority selected by the common consent of the two Governments, who was of opinion that the rivers St. John and Restigouche were not Atlantic rivers within the meaning of the treaty, and that His Majesty's Government therefore trusted that the American Cabinet would concur with that of His Majesty in deciding "that the Atlantic rivers which are to guide the commissioners in searching for the highlands described in the treaty are those which fall into the sea to the westward of the mouth of the river St. Croix;" that a clear agreement on this point must be an indispensable preliminary to the establishment of any new commission of survey; that till this point be decided no survey of commissioners could lead to a useful result, but that its decision turns upon the interpretation of the words of a treaty, and not upon the operations of surveyors; and His Majesty's Government, having once submitted it, in common with other points, to the judgment of an impartial arbiter, by whose award they had declared themselves ready to abide, could not consent to refer it to any other arbitration.
In a note from the Department of State dated 28th April, 1835, Sir Charles R. Vaughan was assured that his prompt suggestion, as His Britannic Majesty's minister, that a negotiation should be opened for the establishment of a conventional boundary between the two countries was duly appreciated by the President, who, had he possessed like powers with His Majesty's Government over the subject, would have met the suggestion in a favorable spirit.
The Secretary observed that the submission of the whole subject or any part of it to a new arbitrator promised too little to attract the favorable consideration of either party; that the desired adjustment of the controversy was consequently to be sought for in the application of some new principle to the controverted question, and that the President thought that by a faithful prosecution of the plan submitted by his direction a settlement of the boundary in dispute according to the terms of the treaty of 1783 was attainable.
With regard to the rule of practical surveying offered as the basis of the American proposition, he said if it should become material to do so—which was not to be anticipated—he would find no difficulty either in fortifying the ground occupied by this Government in this regard or in satisfying Sir Charles that the instance brought into notice by His Britannic Majesty's Government of a supposed departure from the rule was not at variance with the assertion of Mr. Livingston repeated by Mr. McLane. The Secretary therefore limited himself to the remark that the line of demarcation referred to by Sir Charles was not established as the true boundary prescribed by the treaty of 1783, but was a conventional substitute for it, the result of a new negotiation controlled by other considerations than those to be drawn from that instrument only.
The Secretary expressed the President's unfeigned regret upon learning the decision of His Majesty's Government not to agree to the proposition made on the part of the United States without a precedent compliance by them with inadmissible conditions. He said that the views of this Government in regard to this proposal of His Majesty's Government had been already communicated to Sir Charles R. Vaughan, and the President perceived with pain that the reasons upon which these opinions were founded had not been found to possess sufficient force and justice to induce the entire withdrawal of the objectionable conditions, but that, on the contrary, while His Majesty's Government had been pleased to waive for the present six of the seven opinions referred to, the remaining one, amongst the most important of them all, was still insisted upon, viz, that the St. John and Restigouche should be treated by the supposed commission as not being Atlantic rivers according to the meaning of those terms in the treaty. With reference to that part of Sir Charles's communication which seeks to strengthen the ground heretofore taken on this point by the British Government by calling to its aid the supposed confirmation of the arbiter, the Secretary felt himself warranted in questioning whether the arbiter had ever given his opinion that the rivers St. John and Restigouche can not be considered according to the meaning of the treaty as rivers falling into the Atlantic, and he insisted that it was not the intention of the arbiter to express the opinion imputed to him.
The Secretary also informed Sir Charles that the President could not consent to clog the submission with the condition proposed by Her Majesty's Government; that a just regard to the rights of the parties and a proper consideration of his own duties required that the new submission, if made, should be made without restriction or qualification upon the discretion of the commissioners other than such as resulted from established facts and the just interpretation of the definitive treaty, and such as had been heretofore and were now again tendered to His Britannic Majesty's Government; that he despaired of obtaining a better constituted tribunal than the one proposed; that he saw nothing unfit or improper in submitting the question as to the character in which the St. John and Restigouche were to be regarded to the decision of an impartial commission; that the parties had heretofore thought it proper so to submit it, and that it by no means followed that because commissioners chosen by the parties themselves, without an umpire, had failed to come to an agreement respecting it, that the same result would attend the efforts of a commission differently selected. The Secretary closed his note by stating that the President had no new proposal to offer, but would be happy to receive any such proposition as His Britannic Majesty's Government might think it expedient to make, and by intimating that he was authorized to confer with Sir Charles whenever it might suit his convenience and comport with the instructions of his Government with respect to the treaty boundary or a conventional substitute for it.
On the 4th of May, 1835, Sir Charles R. Vaughan expressed his regret that the condition which His Majesty's Government had brought forward as an essential preliminary to the adoption of the President's proposal had been declared to be inadmissible by the American Government.
Sir Charles confidently appealed to the tenor of the language of the award of the arbiter to justify the inference drawn from it by His Majesty's Government in regard to that point in the dispute which respects the rivers which are to be considered as falling directly into the Atlantic. The acquiescence of the United States in what was understood to be the opinion of the arbiter was invited, he said, because the new commission could not enter upon their survey in search of the highlands of the treaty without a previous agreement between the two Governments what rivers ought to be considered as falling into the Atlantic, and that if the character in which the Restigouche and St. John were to be regarded was a question to be submitted to the commissioners the President's proposition would assume the character of a new arbitration, which had been already objected to by the Secretary. Sir Charles also stated that while His Majesty's Government had wished to maintain the decisions of the arbiter on subordinate points, their mention had not been confined to those decided in favor of British claims; that the decisions were nearly balanced in favor of either party, and the general result of the arbitration was so manifestly in favor of the United States that to them were assigned three-fifths of the territory in dispute and Rouses Point, to which they had voluntarily resigned all claim.
Sir Charles acknowledged with much satisfaction the Secretary's assurance that if the President possessed the same power as His Majesty's Government over the question of boundary he would have met the suggestion of a conventional line, contained in Sir Charles's note of 31st May, 1833, in a favorable spirit. He lamented that the two Governments could not coincide in the opinion that the removal of the only difficulty in the relations between them was attainable by the last proposal of the President, as it was the only one in his power to offer in alleviation of the task of tracing the treaty line, to which the Senate had advised that any further negotiation should be restricted. He said that he was ready to confer with the Secretary whenever it might be convenient to receive him, and stated that as to any proposition which it might be the wish of the United States to receive from His Majesty's Government respecting a conventional substitute for the treaty of 1783, it would in the first instance, to avoid constitutional difficulties in the way of the Executive, be necessary to obtain the consent of Maine, an object which must be undertaken exclusively by the General Government of the United States.